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Editorial Note
This Asbury Theological Journal is dedicated to Professor
Robert A. Traina on the occasion of his retirement from th e
faculty of Asbury Theological Seminary.
Professor Traina was born on August 27, 1921, in Chicago, the
His father was a member of the
son of Italian immigrants.
Methodist Episcopal Church, but served as lay pastor to the Italian
Mission Free Methodist Church in Melrose Park, Illinois. In this
church Robert was nurtured in the Christian faith and first sensed
the call to parish ministry at the age of 16.
Professor Traina majored in religious studies and minored in
Greek (classical and biblical) at Spring Arbor College and Seattle
Pacific College . During these years his interest in biblical studies
was kindled. While a student at Seattle Pacific, Professor Traina
became aware of the program at The Biblical Seminary in New
York; and in the fall of 1943 he and his new bride, Jane Odell,
arrived in New York where he began his seminary education.
The Biblical Seminary in New York, founded in 1900 by the
Yale-educated Se mitist Wilbert Webster White, had gained a
worldwide reputation for the "inductive method" of the stud y of
the English Bible. Courses in English Bible formed the center of
the curriculum; the emphasis was upon the direct study of the
Bible, and the goal was to allow the text to speak on its own
terms, challenging all presuppositions and conforming the whole
person to its message. Professor Traina found this approach to be
a liberating experience. He had come to seminary, according to
his own account, with a deductive personality, and the inductive
approach changed his orientation to life and to the Bible.
The Biblical Seminary emphasized effective and creative
teaching, and professor Traina encountered there masters of the
classroom, including Caroline Palmer, Dean Greer McKee,
Howard Tillman Kuist (adjunct from Princeton Theological
Seminary), and Edwin Lewis (adjunct from Drew Universi ty).
Professor Traina excelled as a student at The Biblical Seminary ,
and the faculty, recognizing his extraordinary gifts, enco uraged
him to serve the church as a teacher in theological education.
Indeed, they hired him as a member of the faculty upon his
graduation from seminary.
During his early years of teaching at The Biblical Seminary,
Professor Traina became troubled at the lack of integration
between English Bible and traditional exegesis. He judged that
English Bible, as it was being taught at The Biblical Seminary,
was not as comprehensive and specific as was needed to teach
Out of this concern, Professor Traina
students effectively.
expanded and sharpened the method of English Bible.
He
developed it into an organized and comprehensive approach,
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combining the unique f ea tu res of the inductive method as it had
been taught over the years with the insights and tools of
traditional exegesis. Professor Traina set forth his approach to
inductive Bible study in his book, Methodical Bible Study,
published in 1952. This book, translated into several languages,
has been used in scores of colleges and seminaries around the
world , and has served as the basis for many other works on Bible
study. Its sales have averaged 2,500 copies a year. It would be
difficult to overestimate the effect this book has had on the
Church.
In the early 1960s, The Biblical Seminary in New York
experienced a time of transition , resulting in a radical change in
the nature of the seminary itself. At this time, Professor Traina
concluded that he could best minister elsewhere; and in 1966,
having just earned his Ph.D. from Drew University, he accepted
an invitation to join the faculty of Asbury Theological Seminary
as a professor of English Bible. After serving as academic dean
and vice president for academic administration from 1967 to 1975,
he resumed full-time teaching in English Bible, from which he
will retire at the end of the academic year 1987-88.
In addition to Methodical Bible Study, Professor Traina's
scholarly contributions include two chapters in Interpreting God 's
Word for Today : An Inquiry into Hermeneutics from a Biblical
Theological Perspecti ve. vol 11, Warner Press, Anderson, IN, 1982,
and articles in Baker's Dictionary of Christian Ethics, Baker Book
House, Grand Rapids, MI, 1973, Christianity Today, and The
Asbury S eminarian. He is currently engaged in writing a sequel to
Methodical Bible Study. But Professor Traina's most enduring
influence will no doubt be found in the lives and ministries of his
students.
The contributors to this issue of the Asbury Theological
Journal have been chosen from among the most eminent of
Professor Traina's teachers, colleagues and students. Dr. David L.
McKenna, president of Asbury Theological Seminary, writes the
tribute. Dr. William J. Abraham, a memeber of the faculty at
Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University,
addresses the difficult issue of authorial intentionality in the
interpretave process . Dr. Jerry H. Gill , associate professor of
religious studies at the College of St. Rose in Albany, New York,
and a widely recognized philosopher in his own right, contributes
an article dealing with contemporary philosophical problems
surrounding hermeneutics.
Dr. Eugene Lemcio, professor of
religion at Seattle Pacific University, explores the redaction of the
"love commands" in the synoptic Gospels in the light of Pirke
Dr. Donald G . Miller, who has served on the
'Abot 1:2(3).
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faculties of The Biblical Seminary in New York, Union
Theological Seminary in Virginia and as president of Pittsburgh
Theological Seminary, and whose impressive career includes major
works in biblical studies, theology and preaching, offers a
challenging discussion of the New Testament concept of "witness ."
Finally, Dr. Robert W. Lyon, professor of New Testament
interpretation at Asbury Theological Seminary, looks again at the
interpretation of a crucial passage in the Gospel of John.
It is my hope that this issue will serve as a worthy tribute to
one of the great teachers in the Church .

DAYID R. BAUER, Ptt.D .
Guest Editor

Tribute to
Robert A. Traina
Teaching is a calling, a gift, a discipline and a ministry. When
the Apostle Paul urged the Ephesians to live and work worthy of
the particular grace which Christ Jesus had apportioned to them,
he identified teachers as colleagues with apostles, prophets and
evangelists and saw their common task,
... to prepare God's people for works of service, so that the
body of Christ may be built up until we all reach unity in
the faith and in the knowledge of the Son of god and
become mature, attaining to the whole meas ure of the
fullness of Christ (Ephesians 4: 11-13, NIV).
Robert Traina answered the call of God to teach and accepted
the gift of teaching as his lifetime ministry. Consequently, he
stands among apostles, prophets and evangelists as a colleague in
the common task of preparing "God's people for the works of
service." I am only one among multitudes who can witness to the
influence of Dr. Traina's teaching, which has not only built the
Body of Christ in the unity of faith and knowledge but also
nurtured our maturity toward the "whole measure of the fullness
of Christ."
Although I never took a class from Robert Traina, he is my
teacher. As a young seminarian in the early 1950s, I had a thirst
to know the Word of God . Survey courses in Bible had given me
a "skimming knowledge" of the Word. Critical courses in Bible
had given me a "needle knowledge" of the Word. Both were
needed and valuable. But then I enrolled for my first course in
English Bible, a study of the Book of Judges. Methodical Bible
Study, by Robert Traina, served as our textbook. The course
awakened me to the Word in a way that I shall never forget.
After I learned the principles of inductive Bible study and applied
them to the study of the Book of Judges, the Spirit of God broke
through my study with an insight that was at once creative,
inspired and practical. My mind raced and my spirit leaped as
never before in a learning situation. For the first time, I knew
what the Apostle Paul meant when he described the "unity of
faith and knowledge" as an outcome of teaching. Throughout the
night, I found myself waking up with the anticipation of sharing a
biblical insight with my professor and fellow students. Naively,
but honestly, I was convinced that I had discovered a truth in the
Word of God that no one had ever seen before. Then and there,
inductive Bible study became a lifetime commitment.
Years later, as president of Seattle Pacific University, I learned
that Robert Traina and his wife Jane were graduates of the school.
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In the search for our most distinguished alumni, their nam es
surfaced as two people whose lives and ministries exemplified the
ideals of the Christian university. The circles of their influence
were far wider than might be expected. Dr. Traina, as a professor
at The Biblical Seminary in New York and then Asbury
Theological Seminary, stood at the very center of the movement to
bring English Bible into the heart of the seminary curriculum .
Although the classical tradition of theological education and the
critical tradition of biblical study militated against this more
practical intrusion, the values of English Bible were spelled out in
the responses of students whose preaching and teaching were
measurably enhanced. They did not hesitate to say so. When the
time came to nominate the Alumnus of the Year for 1978 at
Seattle Pacific University, Robert Traina was named and selected.
Together with Jane and the family, we honored him in the
U niversity Chapel, the annual homecoming event, an alumni
dinner and a community reception. Not without significance, the
event stands out as highlight of celebrating the new status of
Seattle Pacific as a "University."
When I accepted the presidency of Asbury Theological
Seminary in 1982, the Trainas and McKennas were joined togeth er
again as colleagues in a new dimension of preparing God's people
for works of service. Early on, I remember pass ing his classroom
door and seeing his meticulous and penetrating outline on the
ever-present overhead screen. When I asked students about their
learning, they invariably mentioned the insights of Dr. Traina's
classes for preaching value and spiritual growth.
When the
opportunity came to establish a new professorial chair in the
Seminary, I had the privilege of presiding at the installation of Dr.
Traina as the Fred M. and Ada Thompson Professor of Biblical
Studies.
Most notable for the occasion , Pat Robertson, the
television evangelist and presidential candidate, came to give the
installment address for Dr. Traina. As one of his students at The
Biblical Seminary in New York, Robertson spoke the witness, " Dr.
Traina brought the Word of God to life for me."
More recently, we have seen the consecration of Robert Traina
to his calling. Periodic bouts of physical illness ha ve sapped hi s
strength. Yet, even if it has meant getting out of bed only for the
hours of his classes, he has taught whenever it is humanl y
possible. As a former dean of the Seminary, his preparation for
teaching and his dedication to the classroom are exemplary for our
faculty.
Although Dr. Traina managed his own physical suffering, the
dreaded cancer that took the life of his wife, Jane , caused him
pain that seemed to know no limit. The brightness, bounce a nd
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beauty which Jane exuded so naturally was taken from his life.
Only his faith and family have sustained him during the time of
grief. Outwardly, he has kept his composure, faithfully carried
out his duties, and continued to minister to the others, but
inwardly he weeps over his loss even while he cherishes the
memories of life with Jane and claims the promise of eternal life.
The "Jane Traina Bookstore" at the Seminary is a permanent
memorial to her "counter ministry" with students, faculty,
administration, book agents and visitors alike.
Retirement is only another chapter in Dr. Traina's life history.
His influence at the center of the English Bible movement will
continue to spread in ever-widening circles wherever the gospel is
preached. At the Seminary, his students who are now professors,
Drs. David Thompson and David Bauer, are already rising in
professorial, pastoral and scholarly stature to take his place. The
revision of his Methodical Bible Study will continue to be a
widely-used textbook that is timeless. Our Seminary curriculum
gives required study in English Bible its rightful place among
more classical courses. And, in the future, we envision the full
endowment of the Professorial Chair of English Bible.
Dr. Robert Traina, on behalf of the trustees, faculty and
students of Asbury Theological Seminary, we thank God for you
and celebrate your lasting ministry among us.

DA YID L. MCKENNA
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Intentions and the
Logic of Interpretation
WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM
What exactly are we doing when we say that an author's intentions should or should not have a role in the interpretation of a
text? Are we making a claim about a crucial piece of evidence
which should be taken into account, if at all poss ible? Or are we
making a claim about grammar or logical character of the whole
enterprise of interpretation? In this paper I shall mount a modest
case for the latter way of construing this issue . I shall argue, that
is, that the debate about intentions has been misplaced.I It has
less to do with external avowals which an author may or may not
make about the meaning of his work and much more to do with
the fundamental goal of the interpretative process as a whole. We
will begin by sketching more fully the first option and examining
the case against appeal to intentions on that level.
When an author's intentions in writing a particular text operate
as a piece of external evidence, the logic of the situation is
relatively straightforward. In puzzling over the meaning of a text,
we normally assemble all sorts of evidence. We take into acco unt
the genre, the grammar, the style, the literary context, the usus
loquendi of the words used, the circumstances in which the text
was written, how it may have bee n or was received in its day,
how it may have been composed and put together over time , and
the like. Alongside these we now place the author's own account
of what he was doing in writing the text under review. According
to our hypothetical theory, the author's avowals will be treated as
decisive in the construal of the text. These avowals ma y themselves be expressed in a variety of ways. They may be written in
diaries or workbooks; or they may have been enshrined in a
commentary on the relevant work; or they may have been made in
some kind of public or private utterance which has been written

William J. Abmham earned his M.Div. degree at Asbury Theological Seminary
and his Ph.D. at Oxford University. He is McCrefess Associate Professor of
Evangelism at Perkins Schoof of Theology, South em Methodist University.
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down and has
Of course, the author's intentions ma y
have been enshrined in the text itself. One thinks immediatel y of
what Luke has to say in his famous prologue or what John says in
his tantalizing comments towards the end of his gospel. But this is
so rarely true that we can overlook it for the moment. In an y
case, the appeal would be much the same: the author's avowals
about his intentions would be treated as having a privileged
position in the debate about the most appropriate rendering of the
text. At the very least it would require very strong evidence to
overturn what the author said he meant on any particular occasion.
The appeal to intentions as evidence for a partic ular
interpretation of a text has not, to my knowledge, been used to
displace the appeal to other kinds of evidence.
Othe r
considerations are to be included in the process of interpretation;
the issue is one of status, not exclusivism. Indeed, as applied to
Holy Scripture the appeal to the intentions of the original author
was embedded in a profound and hard-won attempt to tac kle
questions about the meaning of a text in a rigo rous and
intellectually persuasive manner. On the one hand, it was part of
a move to cut texts loose from dogmatic, theological traditions
which refused to let them speak for themselves. In earlier times
the enemy tended to be the classical creeds of the Church , while
in more recent times the great enemy has been real and imagined
forms of Fundamentalism. On the other hand, it was an attempt
to rid scholarship of faulty methods of interpretation--like
allegory, or hasty, pietistic application--which imposed meanings
on the text which were clearly not there in the first place.
Several interesting assumptions about texts and about human
action are built into this deliberately sketchy account of
interpretation. It is assumed, for example, that texts and autho rs
are not just contingently, but logically, connected . A text is
demarcated from mere markings on paper by its conceptual
relation to human action. Texts are in fact human , inte ntional
actions.
They are the expression of human purposes and
intentions; they are not mere events which occur as the result of
natural, Jaw - like happenings in the world; they embody and ma ke
manifest human consciousness. It is also assumed that, although
texts are actions of human subjects acting to express certa in
intentions and purposes, they are also objects in the world and as
such they possess an independence which stands over against the
would-be interpreter. However difficult it may be to decipher or
read them, texts must be approached with great patience and skill
so that their authors may be heard and understood. They should
not be railroaded into saying something which their authors did
not intend them to say. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
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author's intentions have a privileged position in the process of
interpretation because the author has privileged access to his or
her intentions. Generally speaking, the human subject knows his
or her intentions better than an external observer does, or so it is
widely held. It is this principle which surely operates as the
warrant for the special place of authorial intention in the debate
about interpretation. Finally, it is assumed in this account that we
can draw a distinction between the meaning of a text and the
significance of a text. The former remains stable; it is that which
the author intended to convey in the text. To be sure, our
account of what the author meant may have to change, for new
evidence about authorial intention may come to light and hence
lead to revisions in our interpretation. But that is one thing. It is
another thing entirely to identify the significance of what a text
says. Here we may speak of its truth or falsity, its depth or
shallowness, its relevance or irrelevance, its beauty or plainness,
and so on.
These may change drastically, depending on the
criteria of evaluation we deploy, on the circumstances in which
we find ourselves and on the personal commitments of those
making the evaluation. However we plot the distinction in detail,
some distinction between meaning and significance will be pressed
upon us by those who want to stress the crucial role of intentions
in the act of interpretation.
It is not entirely clear whether the attack on the role of
intentions is meant to cut into all of the aforementioned
assumptions. It may be simply an attack on the status of appeal to
intentions when they are seen as part of wider battery of evidence
which might be mustered by an interpreter.
Or it may be
something much more ontological and philosophical.
It is
absolutely crucial that we be clear about this, for there is far more
to intentions than meets the eye initially.2 This is one of the
enduring merits of attending to the claims of Derrida among the
deconstructionists and Rorty among the new pragmatists.3 The
latter are seeking to undermine in a very profound way the
epistemological foundationalism which has been central to Western
philosophy since Descartes.
Their work in literary criticism
generally, and their attack on intentionalism in particular, are part
and parcel of a wider vision that covers issues which go far
beyond those encompassed in traditional hermeneutics.
An
innovation of the magnitude they are seeking cannot hang on some
kind of intentional fallacy, however generously construed; nor for
that matter can it hinge on appeal to some expert in the field of
literary criticism.
Such an attack will depend on substantive
philosophical moves in epistemology, and Rorty at least is only too
aware of the demands that this lays upon both him and Derrida.
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Indeed, what both Rorty and Derrida want to do is to overturn
philosophy and epistemology, yet to do so they must deploy
recognizably philosophical arguments, a feat which no one has as
yet successfully performed . So we do well to isolate the debate
about intentions initially as a debate about the status of certain
kinds of evidence in the interpretation of a text.
It is not difficult to find fault with the appeal to intentions in
the interpretation of a text, and ever since Wimsatt and Beardsley
published their famous article on the "intentional fallacy," many
have followed their lead in banishing intentions from the process
of interpretation proper. 4 Their strictures about intention were
initially limited to the interpretation of poetry, but as the debate
proceeded they were extended to literature generally.s Of late,
opposition to intentions has been spreading to biblical studies,
most especially among those who are interested in the literary
study of the Bible. It is surely not an exaggeration to say that a
deep division has developed between those who operate
fundamentally as historians and those who operate fundamentally
as literary critics. Up ahead it is likely that the division will
become sharper and deeper.
The attack on intentions is mounted from a variety of angles.
The most popular move at first is to point to the simple fact that
in most cases, say, of the biblical literature, the author's intentions
are not accessible. Like most simple points, this is expected to
settle the issue immediately and its proponents hope to return in
triumph to a closer reading of the text, trusting that they will be
left alone to get on with their work. If this is all there is to the
debate about intentions, then indeed the debate is over and we
had best bury it for good. One could, of course, take the simple
logical expedient of accepting the consequences of this state of
affairs and arguing that this does not overthrow the place of
intentions; it just shows that we are not in a position to interpret
the relevant biblical material. Biblical scholars need not quit their
jobs, but they must now earn a living performing other functions
in the commonwealth of learning. That no one has seriously
suggested this option should make us pause and ponder what is
really at stake in the debate as a whole. Those opposed to
intentions, however, are not going to be satisfied with this abrupt
attempt to keep the commitment to intentions unharmed and
intact. So the attack proceeds apace.
Suppose we have access to the intentions of the author. For
one thing, our author may have failed to execute her intentions in
the work in question.
Yet this does not render her text
meaningless or necessarily obscure. Meaning therefore must be
logically distinct form intentions. For another, the author may
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have abandoned her original intentions in the course of her work
or she may have included material which was not at all central in
her deliberations. If the intentions have in any way changed, they
can be of no help in determining the meaning of the work in
hand. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the author best knows
her intentions. We can all be deceived or ill-informed about our
intentions. In some cases it even appears that the author had no
idea what she was up to until the work was finished and she
turned and read the work for herself, just like any other
intelligent reader. Privileged access, even if it does exist, does not
in the least guarantee infallibility; yet only infallibility could
underwrite the claim that avowals about intentions have a special
status. Add to this the fact that a text often has a surplus of
meaning over and above what the author intended . Our author
may not know the full meaning of what she is saying , or she may
be incompetent or not inclined to declare what she meant. Surely
something along these lines lies behind the commonplace among
Protestants that God has still more light to break from His Word.
The original author may have only been incipiently aware of what
she was saying; to limit oneself to intentional meaning is therefore
restrictive and spiritually debilitating. Texts are far richer than
the standard intentionalist can allow.
Furthermore, persons who talk about the intentions of an
author tend to be general and schematic, so it is not clear how
precisely they will illuminate this or that part of the text. An
author's intention to write a satire or a tragedy does not tell the
reader how to handle the details of the script. Indeed there are
cases where knowledge of the author's intentions tells us next to
nothing about the text. Thus, to know that someone wrote a play
to make a lot of money or to placate an enemy will not get us
very far in the process of interpretation. Nor can the appeal to
intentions set any ultimate guard against subjectivity, as Hirsch
and his admirers so fondly hope, for intentions are by definition
inward mental acts which are not available for inspection by the
general public. It is surely better by far to work with the text in
hand and let its precise and particular features settle whatever
disputes arise. Textual certainties may not amount to much when
weighed in the scales of knowledge, but they are all we have and
they are always to be preferred to biographical speculations which
take us away from the text and into the swamps of endless
background studies and genetic guesswork.
Finally, there are extra considerations which come into play
when we deal with a canonical text of Scripture. Text embodied
in a sacred canon takes on new meaning when read as part of the
canonical whole. As the biblical writers had no idea that their
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work would have canonical status, there is no way in which they
could have intended the meaning that their work now has, given
its place in Holy Scripture.
Attempts to get around this by
claiming that the intentions of the final editors or canonizers , or
even God, are to be the bearers of the relevant intentions is just
one last-ditch effort to save the appeal to intentions. There is
absolutely no warrant in the texts themselves for such a move;
only a dogged commitment to theory precipitates such desperate
expedients.
The consequences of this attack on intentions are extremely
significant for hermeneutics. By far the most interesting for our
purposes is that it calls into question the whole quest to ferret out
the inner life behind the outer text associated with
Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Collingwood. Thus, if this attempt to
reject intentions succeeds, it will make no sense to speak of the
interpreter reversing the causal process which brought the text
into existence or of seeking to relive the thoughts which lie
behind the text. Exercises of this character will be seen as adding
nothing to the task of interpretation properly conceived; on the
contrary, they may well be construed as a devious distraction. To
be sure, such operations may be of some psychological value in
drawing attention to evidence within the text which might
otherwise go unnoticed, but they are of no deep epistemic value
and they are assuredly not the heart of the interpretive enterprise .
Those opposed to intentionalism of one sort or another are not
agreed on exactly what the heart of the enterprise should be .
Some, especially those impressed by Marx, have turned to the
social context of a text, as the key to interpretation. How far this
alternative can avoid an unacceptable form of determinism and
reductionism cannot be pursued here, but there is no denying that
placing texts in their wider social setting can be exceptionally
illuminating and the wise interpreter will develop a keen eye for
the possibilities which this option may make available. Others,
especially those interested in the formal f ea tu res and structures of
language, have turned to a close reading of the text as an
autonomous object as the hope for the future. The text itself is
read and reread until it yields up its riches. Again, there is no
denying the fascinating and penetrating observations which have
emerged from such endeavour.
Others have sought for their
literary salvation in the mining of continental, hermeneutical
philosophy and the theories of meaning developed in this fertile
domain. As some ponder the options, they sometimes gain the
impression that the task of interpretation has become a thoroughly
relativistic operation where subjectivism reigns and where there
are no controls to adjudicate between one interpretation and
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another. 1 suspect that this reaction reflects panic rather than
good judgment, but, where sentiments like this prevail, it is small
wonder that the commitment to intentions as a crucial issue in
hermeneutics dies very hard indeed .
If intentions are to be seen as crucial, however, it should not
be because appeal to intentions is the only way to head off
relativism or subjectivism. Taking this line, aside from tending to
beg vital questions against rival visions of interpretation , is likely
to breed fantasy and confusion in our hermeneutics . If intentions
are important, it is not just because we want them to be important
or because we fail to be attracted by anti-intentionalist or nonintentionalist accounts of interpretation. They should be taken
seriously because reference to them is logically indispensable in
any plausible account of interpretation.
In recent analytical
philosophy precisely such an account has emerged over the last
generation. The account in question began !ife as an attempt to
solve certain problems in the philosophy of language and was then
applied to the debate about interpretation.
Even though the primary work on this issue is highly
technical, the relevant data for the task of interpretation can be
stated quite succinctly. The key point to grasp is that the meaning
of an utterance is not just a matter of the discourse deployed or
the sentences uttered; it is fundamentally a matter of the speech
act performed by the speaker on specific occasions in particular
contexts.
Moreover, the speech act performed is in turn
determined by the intentions of the relevant speaker. Hence the
interpretation of an utterance, and by extension the interpretation
of a text, is logically related to the action performed by the person
or persons who made the utterance or produced the text, and the
action can only be identified by referring to the intention which
governs it.
The standard way to deal with the issue at stake here is to
attend to what J. L. Austin referred to as the illocutionary force
of an utterance. 6 Thus when someone in normal circumstances
seriously utters the sentence, "Shut the door," there are three
distinct elements to be noted. There is the locution itself or the
locutionary act; the speaker has said this particular sentence.
There is, secondly, the act performed in what has been said; in
this case an order has been given.
Finally, there is a
perlocutionary element in that this particular act may have had
certain effects on its hearer; say, it may have made the hearer feel
sad. According to Austin and those who have borrowed or built
on his work, understanding the illocutionary force of an utterance
is essential to understanding the meaning of an utterance, hence it
is quite inadequate simply to attend to the public meaning of the
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sentence uttered . Thus, to take a hackneyed example, if someone
were to say, "There is thin ice over there," it is essential not only
to know what the various parts of this sentence mean in English
but also to know how the speaker is using the sentence. Normally
we ta ke it as an affirmation, but in various circumstances this
sentence could be an order, a warning, an insult or a request. To
know this we need to know the intentions of the speaker in using
this particular utterance. Discarding any reference to intentions
and attending closely merely to the locutionary act in question will
e liminate , therefore, an essential ingred ient in the meaning and
hence in the understanding of the utterance. What applies to this
short, pithy utterance also applies to whole stretches of utte rance
such as we find in written texts.
Needless to say, various aspects of this proposal have co me
unde r attack in the philosophy of language .7 Enough of it remains
intact, however , to cut deepl y into the d ebate about intentions.
What is especially important is the general orientation which it
gives to the interpretive process. Even if the case has not been
fully made for intentions as the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the identification of illocutionary force, it sets texts
very firmly in the domain of human actions . So Dilthey and his
admirers were correct to develop a general hermeneutic which
would focus on the understanding of human actions generally as
the key to understanding texts. A text is not so me abstract entity
floating in free space endowed with meaning by some mystical
agent called language or discourse. Nor are texts natural objects
produced by passive, unintentional agents. Whatever else they are,
texts are fundamentally the fru it of human action and are
generally created to express human intentions and purposes.
Speakers produce meaning, not texts per se; in this process they
make use of discourse, and to reverse this order and focus
primarily on language and secondarily on what is actually achieved
by use of language is to get the cart before the ho rse. As
Strawson puts it succinctly, " as theorists, we know nothing of
human language unless we understand human speech." 8
Hence , when interpreters debate the role of intentions in their
wo rk it is hope lessly inadequate to resolve this issue simply by
insisting that we may not have access to the avowals of the author
as to what he or she meant. To work on this level is to work
bereft of crucial conceptual tools and thus prevent the relevant
issues being canvassed appropriately from the outset of the
discussion. Besides, making an avowal about our inte ntion is only
one way of getting access to our intention, and we may be more
or less fallible in our claims in this domain. The text itself will
be a vital part of the evidence as to what intentions are expressed
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in the work, and it is the task of the interpreter to develop skill in
picking up what they are and hence determining what the force of
the utterance under review may be. Nor will it do to confuse
intentions with logically distinct matters such as motives, desires,
feelings and other mental acts and events.9 To do so is to make
elementary blunders in the philosophy of mind and breed
unnecessary confusion in the field of hermeneutics.
Yet we must be careful in all our claims about both human
actions and intentions . The terrain here is extraordinarily slippery
and it is easy to fall prey to simplistic theories of action.
Contrary to the standard orthodoxy on the subject, I seriously
doubt if a general theory of human action is in fact intellectually
attainable. This is not to decry the attempt to tie actions to
intentions conceptually, but I am not fully convinced that all that
human agents do as responsible agents is done intentionally. It is
certainly useful to begin with a firm connection between actions
and intentions, but this is the first word; it is unlikely to be the
last. Thus I may set out to do x and end up doing y without at all
realizing what I was doing or intending to do what I did. For
example, contemporary television evangelists insist that they are
simply using modern media to spread the old-time gospel, while in
actual fact many of them are offering a new gospel message and
their actions are more akin to that of an entertainer than that of
an evangelist.
That they would vehemently reject such a
description of their action is beside the point. They are simpl y
unaware of the social character of their behavior and how it may
be legitimately understood.
If this example seems too
controversial, consider the situation where I set out to shoot
Murphy in the Enniskillen stockyard filled with cattle. I fire and
miss, but my action of shooting scares the cattle and they
stampede, trampling Murphy to death. Here I have the intention
to kill Murphy and I kiII him, congratulating myself all the way to
prison for what I have done; but I do not kill him intentionally . I
suspect that examples like these may crop up quite frequently in
our work on human texts, and anti-intentionalists are correct to
focus on how tricky intentions really are. However, they tend to
misread the significance of their astute observations by failing to
see this as a signal to look afresh at the whole notion of action
rather than as an invitation to focus on texts in themselves. We
need to pursue the complexity of human speech - acts rather than
just look again at the language and text. This is what I meant at
the outset of this paper when I suggested that the debate about
intentions was misplaced; it is less a matter of the relevance of
certain kinds of evidence than it is about the total orientation of
our work in hermeneutics. It is crucial in this orientation to place
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texts where they belong; in the stream of human life, thought and
action.
We might summarize the fundamental thesis we are driving
towards in this wa y: Hermeneutics is not so much the stud y of
what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved.
If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention
and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more o r less
than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and
charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and
achievement may coincide more often that not. In an y case, the
old proverb holds; actions speak louder than words; so it is the
actions which should get our full attention.
Moreover, in
understanding actions we do well to adopt the lofty vision outlined
by Dilthey: " The ultimate goal of the hermeneutic process is to
understand an author better than he understood himse lf." 10 This
is clearl y the case with many human actions, and thus we do well
to set ourselves this task in hermeneutics. In the light of this, the
task of the interpreter is to summon all the relevant evidence and
all the ski ll that can be mustered to elucidate the nature of the
achievement in question . For the author, the road to mea ning is
paved by good achievements, and the versatile and wily
interpreter will map out such achievements as lucidly as possible.
In constructing such maps, it will be useful to bear the following
general rubrics in mind (all of which stem from construing a text
as an achievement or an action and all of which have been
vigorously advocated at one time or another in the history of
hermeneutics).
First, it is useful to keep a distinction between the elucidation
of a text and the evaluation of a text. As with the evaluatio n of
actions generally, it is morally required that we know what a
person has done in some detail before we evaluate the worth of
what has been done. This holds for the study of action in the
writing of texts. In the evaluation of a text, it is important a t
times to bear in mind the intended aim of the author.
For
example, if a writer intended to write a satire or an apocalypse, it
is clearly erroneous to evaluate such work as if it were a piece of
sober historical narrative . Intention in itself does not determine,
in some simplistic fashion, precisely what value we should attach
to a particular work, but it should be taken into account in the
evaluative process overall. We may even need to take into account
the motives of an author as we evaluate a text. Thus, if we know
that a writer's motive was to smear the good name of an
opponent, then this will have an obvious bearing on our val ue of
the worth of the text. The process of evaluation as a whole will
involve a variety of criteria, depending on our commitments and
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the express point of our evaluations. The good interpreter will
develop a high degree of self knowledge in this area without
sacrificing nimbleness of touch and economy of operation.
Second, in elucidating a text, it will be crucial to attend to the
linguistic repertoire of an author. The study of grammar, syntax,
vocabulary, genre, style, local idioms, usage, and the like, are
indispensable. In this there is no substitute for the demanding
task of mastering the original languages. The loss of these in the
modern seminary is surely to be deeply regretted. Also crucial is
a knowledge of how to read a book as a whole, dismantle it and
then put it back together again . Here concessions to the natural
language of the reader can legitimately be made, and it is crucial
to bear in mind the communicative conventions Traina has
captured in his analysis of the relationships to be found with a
text. 11
We need also to bear in mind the innovations and
transformations which an author may have introduced. In all, we
need to know the capacities and range of options available to an
author in producing a text. If we neglect this, we are liable to
underestimate or overestimate what has been , or fail to perceive
what action has actually been performed .
Third, we need to develop a keen eye for the historical context
and particular circumstances in which a text has been written. At
this point, the current wrangle between historians and literary
critics is of deep significance. It is certainly true that historians
have not always served us as well as they might. As far as the
interpretation of Scripture is concerned, they have at times
dismantled the texts into atomistic bits and pieces, they have lost
the text in a mass of genetic and background information, they
have indulged in fanciful speculation which is intellectually
unedifying, they have set unduly restrictive limits on the options
open to the contemporary theologian, and they have arrogantly set
aside exegetical insights from the astonishingly rich heritage of
interpretation which is available to us. Whatever catalogue of sins
we cobble together, we cannot ignore history if we construe the
interpretation of a text as the interpretation of a human
achievement. Achievements take place in a context and in a set of
circumstances. To understand them is to see them as making sense
within the conventions, assumptions, values, beliefs and attitudes
of their situation. Hence our knowledge of an author's repertoire
of linguistic action depends on historical information about the
period and the circumstances of the actual writing. Those who
focus on a close reading of the text as an autonomous object

either ignore this at their peril or smuggle precisely such
information into the interpretive process without acknowledgment.
There is another reason why history is important. Some texts
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cannot be understood at all adequately if we do not know
something about the ideas and the events concerning which they
speak. If we read a text ahistorically in such circumstances we are
liable to go astray. Equally, if a writer is making a rejoinder to
another text, it is important that we have access to such
information. Thus, if an interpreter insists that Job is a response
to Deuteronomy, or that James is a response to Paul, we need the
aid of the historian in evaluating such claims. How we resolve
these issues will have a clear bearing on the illocutionary force of
much of what is said. We cannot say in advance when or how
historical information will be relevant.
Some texts are more
heteronomous than others, but even in seemingly autonomous
books like Proverbs it is exceptionally illuminating to have some
idea of the proverbial repertoire available at the time of writing,
the traditions out of which the book emerges, and the way in
which the current text of Proverbs may represent or depart from
these conventions.
Of course our judgments in history are
invariably contested , and it is easy to be carried away by those
alternatives which chime with our prepossessions. The sensitive
interpreter will soon learn to make a virtue of such necessities
while taking with radical seriousness the canons of historical
judgment.
It is in this context that we should deal with the place of a
text within the canon of Scripture as a whole . Two points deserve
mention.
First, it is both important and useful to see what
happens to our understanding of a text when it has been placed in
a sacred canon by a community of faith . It is best to designate
our intellectual undertakings at this level not as the elucidation of
the text but as the careful integration of the content of a variety
of texts in a wider theological vision. When we appropriate the
significance of a text of Scripture and relate it intimately to our
expanding metaphysical commitments, how we do so will depend
in part on how we relate that text to our understanding of other
relevant, scriptural texts. Significance, in turn , will depend o n
elucidation in the sense that we cannot satisfactorily gauge the
value of a text without first knowing what the text means. He nce
we need to tread warily when claims are made about the canonical
meaning of a text.
Perhaps we should speak of canonical
significance rather than canonical meaning .
Second, when we deal with the text as part of the canon of
Scripture much more attention needs to be given to the broader
historical considerations which are at stake.
The process of
canonization was part of a wider enterprise which the early church
initiated in order to deal with its life and teachings in the crises
which it faced over several centuries. Thus to cope with its
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problems, the church not only put together a canon of Scripture, it
also developed various creeds and put episcopacy in place. On an
intellectual level, there is a deep sense in which creed and
Scripture go together canonically, while episcopacy can be read as
an attempt to secure these canons as integral to the social authority
of the church and as constitutive of its identity. Much harm has
been done in Protestantism when this is neglected. Scripture has
been called upon to perform functions which were designed to be
met by the creeds, and the creeds have been ignored or neglected
in the canonical construal of Scripture. A canonical reading of
Scripture which fails to take into account the early creeds of the
church is therefore historically inept, and this is one more reason
for treating the canonical interpretation of Scripture at the level of
significance and appropriation rather than at the level of
elucidation and exegesis.
In conclusion , one further point springs naturally to mind in
our brief comments on the rubrics of interpretation. When we
deal with a text, we cannot ignore the subject or particular
content in which the writer is engaged. To take a simple example,
adequate elucidation of a classical philosophical text depends in
part on one's capacity to understand philosophical ideas and issues.
The good interpreter will be able to draw on insights which have
been furnished by wrestling with the questions the text addresses
and with rival ways of construing and resolving them. Initially,
one's capacity in this field may well develop by means of
extensive interaction and dialogue with the text in hand . More
appropriately, we might say that our reading of a text is like a
dialogue with an author or speaker whose action continues across
space and time into the present to inform and develop our
judgments and latent human capacities.
This is clearly the case with Scripture. Deep and profound
elucidations of the text depend on spiritual insight and on
theological sensitivity as well as on standard linguistic, literary and
historical skill. This is as it should be if the interpretation of a
text is the interpretation of a human achievement, for this is
inevitably set in the stream of human life, thought and action.
Out of the richness of their experience, the depths of their
theological acumen, the storehouse of their ability to communicate
their proposals, the great interpreters take the reader into a new
world of wonder and challenge where fresh horizons are
encountered and prevailing capacities are developed.
It is
impossible to capture what is at stake here in a set of formal rules
or in conceptual analysis of the underlying assumptions and
principles. These have their place, but they are no substitute for
direct exposure to those who have already mastered this art and
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can share it with others. In this respect it is difficult to surpass
what Robert Traina instantiates for those fortunate enough to have
been his students.
·
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Mediated Meaning:
A Contextualist Approach to
Hermeneutical Method
JERRYH. GILL
Traditionally defined as "the science of interpretation ,"
hermeneutics has of late evolved into a full-fledged philosophical
concern of its own. Flowing out of the two opposing branches of
the early twentieth century's " search for meaning" (analytic and
existentialist philosophy), hermeneutics stands today as the central
intersection of dialogue within and among such diverse disciplines
as philosophy, linguistics, the arts, political theory, psychology and
theology. The issues and points of view are many and diverse.'
My purpose here is to sketch, in broad strokes, the main contours
of the landscape and to provide a suggested perspective or
"inscape" of my own .
The modern era of hermeneutical understanding was ushered
in with the introduction of the historical-critical method of
textual interpretation.2
In a much needed and eventually
successful attempt to counteract the tyrannical dominance of
authoritarian and/ or spiritualizing hermeneutical activity, modern
scholarship turned to objective, scientific criteria and procedures
for determining what a given text meant . I stress the past tense of
the term "meant" advisedly, for the emphasis of the historicalcritical approach has consistently been on ascertaining what the
text meant for the writer and those to whom it was originally
addressed. By means of historical and textual research , including
and especially archeological investigation, modern interpreters
have sought to bridge the gap between the time of the text and
their own, thereby facilitating a contemporary understanding of
the text's meaning. Norman Perrin offers a fair account of this
historical-critical method in the following passage:
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In the case of texts from another time and another culture
this can be an extremely complex and difficult task ,
involving many different considerations, but the theoretical
principles involved are both firmly established and well
understood. We need, further, to understand as far as we
can the intent of the author in writing the text, and the
meaning understood by those for whom the text was
written. For all of this we need a number of different
critical skills, and ultimately a measure of historical
imagination, as we seek to understand the text as the
author intended it to be understood, or as it was
understood by those who first read it.3
Over against what they perceived as the dehumanizing effects
of the "cult of objectivity" existentialist thinkers arose, ad vocating
a more personal, subjective approach to hermeneutics. 4 Not only
is there no way to know the original meaning of a given text ,
since, as Kierkegaard demonstrated, "significant" meaning always
transcends mere probability and observation, there is no need to
know it, since what really matters for us is what the text means
for today, here and now. In spite of their antipathy for each
other, those advocating the historical-critical method and those
touting the existentialist posture are agreed that there is a meaning
to be found in the text, a message or lesson which can be
discerned, either after appropriate scientific investigation , in the
former case, or after proper demythologization, in the latter case.
Bultmann is as clear as he is adamant that the meaning of
biblical texts, for instance, must and can lie only in the fresh
"self-understanding" which it brings to each of us. As he puts it:
The real purpose of myth is not to present an objecti ve
picture of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth
should be
interpreted
not cosmologically,
but
anthropologically, or better still, existentially. Myth speaks
of the power or the powers which man supposes he
experiences as the ground and limit of his world and of his
own activity and suffering. He describes these powers in
terms derived from the visible world, with its tangible
objects and forces, and from human life, with its feelings,
motives, and potentialities ... Hence the importance of the
New Testament mythology lies not in his imagery, but in
the understanding of existence which it enshrines.5
Following along in the subjectivist mode, and drawin g as well
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on the advice of the "new critics" to avoid the fallacy of assuming
anyone can determine the writer's original intentions, the robust
deconstructionists burst on the scene.6 This hermeneutical posture
or non- posture maintains that the meaning of any text is what we
make it, because not only are we unable to reconstruct its original
meaning , either for the author or the readers, but language itself
is incorrigibly vague, ambiguous and contradictory. The meaning
of a text can never be ascertained and / or interpreted, either for
those then or for us now, for the simple reason that language will
not stand still long enough to allow a single meaning--and this
fact ought to be celebrated, rather than lame nted! Any given
statement can be given a number of meanings, sometimes even the
opposite of what it appears to mean, as ironic utterances clearly
illustrate.
One of the more enthusiastic proponents of the
application of this methodology to the theological enterprise is
Mark Taylor. In personal conversation he said to me that it is
"the most important thing to happe n to theology in the latter half
of the twentieth century."
It is significant to note that the decons tructionist
hermeneutical posture, while sharing the subjectivist emphasis of
the existentialist approach, differs both from it and from the
objectivism of the historical-critical perspecti ve by insisting that
meaning is never direct, but is, rathe r, entirely a function of the
hearer's interpretive response.
In other words, according to
deconstructionist thinkers, the focus of meaning has shifted from
the author, to the text itself, and finally to the reade r alone . In
s hort, the activity of interpretation, as well as the meaning of a
given text, has now become so indirect, the focus has become so
"soft," as to be essentially nonexistent. Meaning is in the mind of
the reader or hearer, period.
It is, of course, impossible to de ny both the strengths and
weaknesses of each of these hermeneutical postures. The trick is
to devise some way of integrating the former and avoiding the
latter without ending up with a lumpy eclecticism. Is there a way
to maintain the objectivity and authority of the text, together with
contemporary and personal relevance, and yet acknowledge the
indirect , open- texture of language? By itself the histo rical-critical
method is limited , both in results and scope of application.
Existentialist hermeneutics tends to be not only a-historical but
anti-historical and social. Deconstructionism makes a valuable
point, but becomes pointless--and indeed, meaningless--when
applied to itself. So, one must ask, in Peggy Lee's words, "Is that
all there is?"
My own suggestion at this juncture is to urge the development
of a contextua/ist approach to hermeneutics, one which
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incorporates the emphases and concerns at each of the above
postures. More specifically, a contextualist hermeneutic seeks an
understanding of a text in which meaning is mediated in and
through the historical, existential and linguistic dimensions of
human experience simultaneously. There simply is no need to
choose any of these aspects of our common life as the primary
mode, or to assume that they are mutually exclusive . For, clearly,
our day-to-day existence does not come compartmentalized in
such a manner. The following diagram indicates the relationship
amongst these various emphases and methodologies:

Existentialist
Method

Subjectivity

direct
specific

Objectivity
Historical-Critical
.._ Cognitive
Method

Deconstructionist
Method

indirect
open-texture

Contextualist
Method

As I see it, contextualist hermeneutic is comprised of at least
three main themes, each of which deserves a brief explication.
The following remarks constitute my own "inscape" (with thanks
to Gerard Manley Hopkins) into the hermeneutical thicket
sketched above.
II
First, a contextualized perspective acknowledges the deeply
social and relational character of language and speech. People
speak, not only in order to be understood, but because they are
understood. It is language which mediates social reality to us,
both initially and continuously, and which brings us into the
human community, both as members and as selves . Thus the
hermeneutical task is surely grounded in a basic knowledge of
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what a given text meant in its original human context, both
historically and linguistically. This historical-critical concern is
complemented, rather than set aside, by an equally sincere concern
for the meaning of a text in the contemporary setting. Moreover,
neither of these dimensions is obviated by a sensitivity to the
flexible, open-textured quality of language, a quality which is
necessitated by the ever-evolving social tasks in which language is
employed.
One thinker who has contributed a great deal to this
contextualist perspective is the social psychologist George Herbert
Mead .7 Mead stressed the social character of the human self, and
the crucial role played by language in the composition of both
culture and personhood. He termed the process by means of
which both are constituted, " symbolic interaction," and he argued
cogently for the "thick" understanding of the integral relationship
between language and reality which comprises the fabric of human
existence. Language is more than a mere system of signs for
designating parts and aspects of the world . It is, rather, an
organic form of human behavior that creates and shapes our world
as well as describing it. Here is how he states it:
The central factor in such adjustment is "meaning."
Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation
between the gesture of a given human organism and the
subsequent behavior of this organism as indicated to
another human organism by that gesture. If that gesture
does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or
resultant) behavior of the given organism, then it has
meaning . In other words, the relationship between a given
stimulus--as a gesture--and the later phases of the social
act for which it is an early (if not the initial) phase
constitutes the field within which meaning originates and
exists.
Meaning is thus a development of something
objectively there as a relation between certain phases of
the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and
it is not an "idea" as traditionally conceived .... The social
process, as involving communication, is in a sense
responsible for the appearance of new objects in the field
of experience of the individual organisms implicated in
that process. Organic processes or responses in a sense
constitute the objects to which they are responses; that is
to say, any given biological organism is in a way
responsible for the existence (the meanings they have for
it) of the objects to which it physiologically and chemically
responds. There would, for example, be no food--no
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edible objects--if there were no organisms which could
digest it. And similarly, the social process in a sense
constitutes the objects to which it responds or to which it
is an adjustment. That is to say, objects are constituted in
terms of meanings within the social process of experience
and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one
another of the responses or actions of the various
individual organisms involved in that process, an
adjustment made possible by means of a communication
which takes the form of a conversation gestures in the
earlier evolutionary stages of that process and of language
in its later stages. s
Another contributor to the contextualist approach is the
mature Ludwig Wittgenstein.9 He emphasized the social and acti ve
dimension of speech by likening it to the various "games people
play ." He did not intend thereby to trivialize or demean linguistic
interchange. Rather, he sought to highlight its pragmatic nature,
that it is grounded in our shared tasks and purposes, and thus that
it is a way we do things in and with our common world.
Wittgenstein likened speech to a toolbox, to chess and to the
exchange of money in order to suggest that meaning is, at the
deepest level, a function of use in context. After all , apart from
some concrete use in a particular setting by and to a specific
person(s), a given string of sounds and/ or markings cannot be said
to have any meaning at all. The following is a representati ve
Wittgenstienian insight:
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and yo u
think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the
word , though also different from the word. Here the
word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that
you can buy with it.
(But contrast: money, and its
use .) ... A main source of our failure to understand is that
we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.
Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding
which consists in "seeing connexions" .... 10
Hans-George Gadameru has also contributed to a contextualist
understanding of hermeneutics by means of his explorations in the
phenomenology of language.
Like Wittengenstein , Gadamer
focuses on the participatory and interactionary aspects of linguistic
communication, particularly through the notions of "pla y" and
"conversation." These notions underline both the creati ve and
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dialogical character of speech, indeed, even to the point of
stressing the significance of silence in an overall understanding of
meaning. For Gadamer, language is organic; it grows and dies. In
addition, language is neither optional nor arbitrary; all humans
participate in it to some degree and, at the primordial level, it
arises in the warp and weft of concrete daily existence. As he
says:
Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool.
For it is in the nature of the tool that we master its use,
which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it
has done its service . That is not the same as when we take
the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and
with their use let them sink back into the general store of
words over which we dispose. Such an analogy is false
because we never find ourselves as consciousness over
against the world and , as it were grasp after a tool of
understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our
knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world,
we are always already encompassed by the language that is
our own. We grow up, and we become acquainted with
men and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn
to speak. Learning to speak does not mean learning to use
a preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow
familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and
acquaintance with the world itself and how it confronts
us.12
III
A second motif of a contextualist hermeneutic is an insistence
on the active and pragmatic character of linguistic communication.
Here again, the later Wittgenstein's work has proven to be most
helpful, for it gave rise to the insights of the Oxford philosopher ,
J. L. Austin.n Austin began by noting that frequently we do
more than merely speak when we use language, we sometimes
accomplish deeds as well.
When, for example, we say "I
apologize," or "I pronounce you husband and wife" in the
appropriate circumstances, etc., we are performing the act of
apologizing and pronouncing.
Austin dubbed such utterances
"performatives," and he suggested that as an important form of
speech they break down the traditional dichotomies between
language and reality, and between factual judgments and value
judgments.
In his later work, Austin suggested that every
"speech-act" consists of at least three dimensions of meaning,
each of which is essential to its overall significance.
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Take, for example, the sign which used to hang in British
railwa y lavatories: "Gentlemen Lift the Seat." One might well ask
whether this is a stipulative definition, an empirical description,
an imperative or an invitation to upperclass larceny. Everything
depends on context and use, and in spite of the fact that it is both
enlightening and entertaining to play around with possible
meanings, it is roughly clear what this sign means. However,
Austin would surely suggest that there is a "referential" dimension
to the utterance (there must be gentlemen and a seat, for instance) ,
as well as an "intentional" dimension (what the sign-makers
intended) and a "responsive" dimension (some signs are so
constructed as to give rise to unintended responses). All of these
aspects of meaning must be taken into consideration when
interpreting the sign.
It is this pragmatic thrust of language which counteracts the
unbridled relativism of deconstructionism.
For, although any
given statement is subject to a wide variety of readings , in the
vast majority of cases the context either provides sufficient
guidance by which to ascertain the meaning, or sufficient
feedback by which to determine what went wrong in the case of
misunderstanding. To acknowledge the possibility of multiple
meanings and misunderstandings is a far cry from affirming that
concrete interpretation is impossible. As Wittgenstein put it: " If I
say 'The ground was quite covered with plants,' do you want to
say that you don't know what I mean until I give you a definition
of a 'plant'?" Of course, many readings are possible, even here ,
but that does not mean that some are not better than others. 14
Another thinker, once again a phenomenologist, who f eeds
into the pragmatist current of a contextualist approach to
hermeneutics is Maurice Merleau-Ponty.15
His work on the
pivotal role of human embodiment in the composition of our
particular form of !ife, especially as it involves the use of speech
as a form of bodily behavior, is of front-rank significance .
Merleau-Ponty suggests that through embodiment and language we
interact with and shape our world, both physical and social. In
short, he contends that our world is in large measure linguistically
constituted by means of our interaction with each other in our
common environment for specific shared tasks. We can neither
separate our "inner" selves from our interactional relationships
with the world, nor can we grasp reality and/ or its meaning
directly, apart from these relationships. However, reflection can
"set back ... to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks
from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to
the world and thus brings them to notice."16
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IV
Third, a contextualist stance toward hermeneutical activity
recognizes that, at the primordial level, language and meaning are
fundamentally m etaphoric in nature. The work of Owen Barfield
is highly significant here.17
He calls attention to a deep
contradiction which underlies our modern view of language. On
the one hand , we are generally committed to the idea that people
in ancient and classical (not to say "primitive") times imbibed
myth and metaphor, while we in modern times have " put away
such childish things" in favor of more precise, scientific speech.
On the other hand, we are equally committed to a theory of
language which entails that it begins with specific, literal
meanings and only later are metaphoric and symbolic meanings
derived. But both cannot be true. It cannot be the case that
metaphors build on literal meanings and that the vast majority of
literal terms are in fact "dead" metaphors!
Barfie ld argues that at its inception, whether with respect to
the species or the individual, language must be endemically poetic
in the sense that it does not stand over against or represent reality,
but rather functions symbiotically with it in the mutual
composition of our experienced and known world. Primordial
speech unites thought and reality, analytic speech divides them.
Both, of course, are necessary to human life, but it is clear that
the unity must exist, as a Gestalt, be/ore analysis can take place.
Thus both the historical-critical method and deconstructionism
must acknowledge a more fundamental level of meaning that
provides the context or the foothold for their own activity to have
meaning. We can only analyze, we can only deconstruct, what we
have understood as meaningful in the first place.
One of the most controversial books in philosophical circles in
recent years has been Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. is Kuhn's insights into the development of scientific
thought lend support to the case for a contextualist hermeneutic.
In brief, he contends that in order for any scientific activity to be
carried out there must exist some theoretic framework, some
unarticulated assumptions, forming what Kuhn calls the dominant
paradigm, according to which this activity, including the theoretic
level, gets its direction and meaning. He also maintains that at
certain crucial junctures in the histor y of science, these paradigms
shift, causing a revolution in the way scientists think and work.
The Copernican and Einsteinian revolutions are examples of such
shifts in paradigms.
What is pivotal for our topic is the idea, espoused by an
increasing number of scientific thinkers, that all meaningful
activity and thought must take place within some social and
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linguistic context. Contrary to the warnings of some, this does not
mean that all truth and meaning are relative in the subjectivist,
skeptical sense. Rather, it simply means that serious attention
must be paid to the shape and direction, to the concrete
particulars, of the context within which linguistic meaning arises
when one engages in the task of interpretation. From the fact that
no meaning is contextless it does not follow that meaningful
communication is impossible.
There are many points of connection between the notion of
paradigm and that of metaphor in the primordial sense. It is
within what Stephen Pepper called our "root metaphors" l9 that we
live and move and have our being, at both the practical and
theoretic levels of our common human existence. One could argue
that the history of any culture, especially in relation to
intercultural encounter and dialogue, exhibits shifts in root
metaphors, or mythologies, parallel to the paradigm s hifts in
scientific thought. It is essential that hermeneutical activity be
sensitive to and make constructive use of the differences and
developments within and among various historical and cultural
contexts. 20
One other important thinker whose work supports a
metaphorical understanding of the contextualist approach to
hermeneutics is the Harvard philosopher, Nelson Goodman. In his
delightfully deep little book, Ways of World making , 21 Goodman
invites us to think of the various worlds we inhabit, such as the
worlds of science, economics, art, religion, morality, etc. , as the
result of our collaborative, creative interaction with our
multidimensional environment. They grow out of each other,
overlap with each other, and at times conflict with each other.
These worlds are not fabricated arbitrarily, but arise as we engage
in various shared activities and purposes.
Nevertheless, they
develop organically out of basic alternative ways of
conceptualizing reality. This sort of open-mindedness entails, to
be sure, a kind of relativism, but Goodman insists that this does
not mean "anything goes." He advocates a "relativism with rigor"
in order to distinguish truly helpful root metaphors fro m wildeyed word salad. In his own words:
What I have said so far plainly points to a radical
relativism; but severe restraints are imposed. Willingness
to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions
does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as
good as short ones, that truths are no longer distinguished
from falsehoods, but only that truths must be otherwise
conceived than as correspondence with a ready- made
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world . Though we make worlds by making versions, we
no more make a world by putting symbols together at
random than a carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces
of wood together at random.
The multiple worlds I
countenance are just the actual worlds made by and
answering to true or right versions. Worlds possible or
impossible supposedly answering to false versions have no
place in my philosophy.22

v
What, then, are the potential dividends for religious life and
understanding of this contextualist hermeneutical stance? Clearly
such an approach entails a mediational view of revelation. By this
I mean a view which sees God's activity in the world as mediated
in and through historical, social and natural processes and events.
For the Christian faith the notion of incarnation focuses this
understanding of revelation in an axial fashion.
"The Word
became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld the glory,. .. full
of grace and truth." The emphasis here is on discerned glory
amidst the significant dimensions of life , not on supernatural
intrusions from outer space. Even and especially in Christ we see
through a glass, darkly. I say "especially" because it is only by
means of a mediated mode of revelation that God can embody and
communicate honest love and respect for human decision and
responsibility, as John Hick has so profoundly made clear.23
A contextualist hermeneutic will come at the S criptures in a
similar manner. As a most important mediator of the nature and
meaning of divine revelation, the texts of the Bible must be
interpreted in terms of every relevant dimension: historically,
literarily, culturally, existentially and imaginatively. What the y
meant originally, as best as can be determined , what they have
meant through the centuries, what they mean to us now, and what
they may mean to readers now and in the future--all these
contexts mediate significant meaning, even for one another. The
focus should be on the various root metaphors in each context and
on how they function for the people therein, always with an eye
to what they may yet reveal in our own and other settings. The
Scripture is a record and interpretation of the community of
believers' interaction with what they discern as God's activity in
their midst. Two examples come readily to mind. Martin Luther
King's interpretation of Israel's approach to the "Promised Land"
in relation to the cause of Black people in America and the Civil
Rights Movement was more than mere application, while being
less specific than simple allegory. It constitutes an exemplary case
of contextualist methodology. In a similar vein, the Reformist

38

Gill

dimension of the Christian Feminist Movement constitutes, in my
view, a sound contextualist interpretation of Paul's powerful, if
belatedly understood , remark that "In Christ there is ... no male or
female" (Galatians 3:28). The true meaning of this remark has
only begun to dawn on the Christian Church.
The symbolism and ritual of worship will also be seen in a
different light as a result of a contextualist hermeneutic.
Participation in traditional and / or contemporary worship need not
be viewed as merely that, but can be appreciated as a mediational
means of participating in a multidimensional reality, wherein
significance and value arise through active commitment to and
involvement with the people and events of one's context.
Baptism, the saying of the creeds, and the Eucharist, for example,
are activities we engage in as a community, by means of which we
accomplish or perform certain tasks or acts, and which function
as the primordial metaphors for expressing the discernments and
commitments that lie at the center of our common faith and life.
This is not to say, of course, that symbols and rituals never
become obsolete or that fresh ones can never be created. It is
only to say that such alterations should be effected slowly and
broadly, and that when they occur they will do so as a result of
contours of communal needs, values and goals. Although it has
come as a shock to many Roman Catholics, the reform instituted
by the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s with respect to
the liturgy of the Mass strikes me as an excellent example of a
It seeks a
contextualist interpretation of the worship ritual.
middle ground between past significance and contemporary life,
without self-destructing into sheer subjectivism. Moreover, such
reform establishes connections with other dimensions of the
Christian community, thereby contributing to the unit y of the
Church. Catholic and Protestant dialogue, as well as common
worship and social action, are no longer simply a dream .
Finally, theology itself must also be affected by a contextualist
hermeneutic. The traditional model of theology as a metaph ysical
counterpart to Newtonian science is clearly no longer viable. This
includes all pontifical theologies, of both the philosophical and
dogmatic varieties, left and right. Moreover, the individualized
theologies of the existentialist and deconstructionist brands are of
little help over the long and broad pull. The theologies most
attentive to the contextualist motif would appear to be those being
forged in the socio-political arena on the one hand and those
working the "New Hermeneutic" field on the other hand. The
former must be careful to allow for the distinction betwee n the
mediating context and that which is being mediated, lest the truth
of revelation be equated with the expedient. The latter must pay
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increasing attention to developing the logic of language and story
in a truly metaphoric mode, otherwise we shall once again be
faced with a no-win choice between objectivism and subjectivism.
To my mind, the theologian who is doing the most creative, yet
substantive work in this mode is Sallie McFague.24 Drawing on
the insights of the likes of Robert Funk and Dan Via, as well as
insights of many of the thinkers already mentioned above,
McFague explores the ramifications of approaching theology as an
activity more akin to aesthetic criticism than to science or
philosophy. Focusing on the role of parable as central both to
Jesus's life and work and to the ongoing life of the Church, she
stresses the "story" character of truth in general, as well as the
metaphoric and mediational nature of revelation in particular. In
McFague's words:
The parables of the New Testament are united by a
number of characteristics, of which one of the most
outstanding is their concern with relationships of various
kinds. What is important in the parables is not who the
characters are (a static notion) but what they do (a
dynamic one). The plot is always the heart of a parable,
what a character or several characters decide in matters
having to do with their relationships with each other.
Whether one thinks of the parable of the Prodigal Son , the
Good Samaritan, the Unjust Steward, or the Great Supper,
it is relationships and decisions about them that are
Just as the central Old Testament religious
critical.
language is relational--focused on the covenant between
God and persons and their way of being in the world in
community--likewise, if we look at Jesus as a parable of
God, we have no alternative but to recognize personal,
relational language as the most appropriate language about
God. Whatever more one may wish to say about him, he
was a person relating to other persons in loving service and
transforming power.25
The cardinal concern for a contextual, mediational
understanding of hermeneutics, in addition to its emphasis on
those factors adumbrated in the foregoing pages, is the
acknowledgement that whatever truth we possess, we carry in
"earthen vessels."
No truth can be revealed apart from the
particulars of a concrete context, but no particular context can be
equated with revealed truth. Mediated meaning must be shared
both confidently and with humility, a rare and difficult
combination, but a necessary one.
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VI
Permit me a brief "concluding unprofessional postscript."
have no idea how my initial mentor, Professor Traina, will react
to the foregoing reflections. On the one hand, my concern to
allow the scripture to "speak for itself," liberated from the
tyranny of traditional and/ or parochial agendae, is certainly
traceable to his tireless and insightful efforts in the courses I took
with him thirty years ago. On the other hand, he may complain
that I have collapsed the distinction between interpretation,
application and correlation. To this I can only answer that this
distinction must be called into question, not in order to do away
with it altogether, but in order to do justice to the manner and
degree to which we are embodied and embedded in the language
and thought patterns of our own heritage, both traditional and
contemporary .
Although there is no way we can extricate
ourselves from these webs of meaning in order to be eyeball-toeyeball with truth and/ or reality, we can, by acknowledging both
the limitations and the functional adequacy of our own knowledge
claims, be confident without being arrogant in our hermeneutica l
It is this circumspect confidence at which a
endeavors.
contextualist hermeneutic aims--and that toward which Robert
Traina pointed his students by means of his own example.
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Pirke 'Abot 1:2 (3)
and the Synoptic Redactions
of the Commands
to Love God and Neighbor
EUGENE E. LEMCIO
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical study of Jesus' teaching about love for God and
neighbor (Matt 22:34-40, Mark 12:28- 34, Luke 10:25-28) always
includes some attention to external evidence for both the form and
content of the redaction. The point is commonly made that the
twin commands had already been joined prior to the first century. 1
However, these extra-biblical data are not able to account for
the synoptists' different renderings of Jesus' teaching; no r do the y
explain how these two commands impinge upon Scripture, c ult and
ethics. Consequentl y, it is the purpose of this article to arg ue that
' Abot 1:2 (3) and its subsequent transmiss ion in Judaism may help
redaction critics to address these issues2 with greater precision.
Our procedure will be to describe the phenomena within the
redactional framework of each Gospel , introduce the pertinent
"background" evidence, and then attempt to explain the relation
between them.
II. GOSPELS PHENOMENA

The Love Commandments
In Matthew, Jesus is asked about " the great commandment in
the law" (22:36). He responds with the deuteronomic injunction
(6:5) to love God with all of one's faculties, calling this "the great
and first co mmandment" (v 38). The command to love o ne's
neighbor as oneself (Lev 19: 18) is "like" the first; and upon both
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all the law and prophets "hang" (or may be derived from both , v
40).3 In Mark, the scribe's question is more universal in that he
asks Jesus to identify the commandment which is "the first of all"
(12:28).
After citing the love commands, He declares quite
absolutely that "There is no other commandment greater than
these" (v 31). Unique to Mark, however, is the repetition of
Jesus' response by the scribe (vv 32-33a) who then goes on to
subordinate "all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" to them
(v 33b). When, according to Luke, a nomikos asks what he must
do to inherit eternal !ife (I 0:25), Jesus directs him to find the
answer in the Law. Jn reply, the expert cites the twin commands
as " ... a single imperative ... without a connecting link as in Mark
and Matthew."4 When Jesus urges him to find life by practic ing
what he knows to be true (v 28), the irrepressible lawyer requests
a definition for "neighbor" (v 29). There then follows the parable
of the Good Samaritan, which disallows any boundar y- setting
definition of neighborliness, since one must be prepared to sho w
mercy even to an enemy in need (vv 30-37).
Their R edactional S etting
Each of these respective emphases regarding scriptural
revelation, cult and behavior are in part, at least, expressions of
each evangelist's redactional interests. That Matthew's lawyer
should ask Jesus about the great commandment in the law (v 36) is
not surpnsmg. Earlier, this concern to identify the heart of
revealed religion appears in Matthew's formulation of the " G olden
Rule" (7: 12) and in Jesus' accusing the religious leaders of
neglecting the " ... weightier matters of the law: justice, mercy and
faith" during their scrupulous efforts to tithe even herbs (23:2 3).
Likewise, Jesus' response to the lawyer in terms of " law and
prophets" (that is, the entire scriptural revelation) reflects the
Matthean idio m in his report of Jesus' mission to fulfill " the la w
and the prophets" (5: 17) rather than abolish them (cf. 7: 12).
Intriguingly, in the latter instance as well as at 23:23 , these effo rts
to identify the major thrust of Scripture occur within an
affirmation of the need to observe the minor points, too (5: 18-1 9).
Mark's concern to make these commands supersede the cultus
fits with his redactional program also. He gives more attention to
the debate about ritual cleanliness and dietary scrupulosity at 7: 123 (esp. v 19) than does Matthew ( 15: 1-20). His account of Jesus'
attitude toward the Temple is also more harsh. Mark alone reports
that , in His " cleaning" of the Temple , Jesus in effect closed it
down by preventing the flow of traffic (11:16). Only Mark has
Jesus citing Isa 56:3-7 to make the point that God had intended to
make the shrine a place of prayer for all nations , not me re ly fo r
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Jews (v 17).
Finally, the Second Evangelist makes the false
witnesses at the Sanhedrin's hearing attribute a more negative
attitude of Jesus toward the shrine. There is no reference to its
being the "Temple of God" (cf. Matthew 26:61 ). Whereas Jesus in
Matthew only claims power to destroy it, in Mark He is alleged to
have promised to destroy it and build one without human effort
(14:58).
Luke's stress upon merciful behavior (I 0:28, 37) corresponds to
his rendering of "Q" material about love for one's enemies in
6:27-36. The Third Evangelist heightens the stress on "doing
good" and concludes with the injunction to imitate God's mercy
(rather than His perfection, as in Matt 5:43-48).
Finally, one might suggest the following concerns which these
modifications would have addressed. Matthew's subordination of
the written revelation to these twin commands would have
answered questions among his readers about the relation of Jesus'
teaching to Jewish scripture and tradition. For Gentile Christians,
confused by Jewish Christians who urged them to perfect their
faith by dietary and cultic scrupulosity, Mark insisted that love
for God and neighbor would keep them near to the Kingdom of
God even if the cult were to be terminated by the Temple's
destruction. Luke expanded " the neighborhood" to include such
undesirables as the Samaritan.
Although the stricken Jew's
neighbors (the priest and the Levite) failed to show him mercy,
the foreigner did. That Jews might mediate salvation to the
Gentiles is radical enough; but to have the reverse occur, turns the
world upside down. Such opportunities did occur in the early
decades when Gentile churches came to the aid of the poor saints
of Jerusalem (e.g. , I Cor 16:1-3).
Thus, one can offer an account, based upon internal evidence,
of the synoptic evangelists' renditions of Jesus' teaching about
loving God and neighbor. Yet, it might be possible to understand
them further in the light of certain " background" data.
III. JUDAISM
T estaments of the Twelve Patriarchs
That Jesus was not the first to join the commands to love God
and neighbor cannot be denied . They appear together in T. l ss.
5:2, 7:6 and T. Dan. 5:3.5 In no instance, however, are the y used
to subordinate the Law and cultus; nor do they expand the
boundaries of neighborliness in so radical a fashion.6
Consequently , the T estaments provide no means of accounting for
the use which the Gospel writers make of the twin commands.
Moreover, the usefulness of this material could be minimized by
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any who would suspect Christian interpolations at this point.
such cannot be claimed of the following data.

But

Pirke 'A bot 1:2 ( 3)
A pronouncement attributed to one Simeon the Just stands at
the head of Pirke 'Abot. Although Simeon's precise identity and
date are still debated (ca. 350-200 B.c.E. ),7 the statement in
question, authentic or not, clearly reflects an outlook possible only
while the Second Temple stood:

Simeon the Just was of the survivors of the Great
Assembly. He used to say, "on three things the World [or
Age] stands: on the Torah, on the [Temple] service, and on
deeds of lovingkindness." 9
This formulation by Simeon the Just is so all-embracing that
Judah Goldin sees it as comprising the pillars " ... fundamental to
the architecture of classical Judaism."10
Yet, they are even
broader, for they deal with the fundamentals of religion. R.
Herford put the matter precisely and succinctly: "The three things
represent revelation, worship and sympathy, i.e., God's word to
man, man's response to God, and man's love to his fellow men." 11
The impact of Simeon's statement was so profound that it
dominated thinking for several centuries thereafter. Subsequent
sages, while not directly helpful for our interpretation of the
Gospels because of their late date, nevertheless show both how
fundamental was the hold of Simeon's dictum (in that it was
preserved intact) and how it became adapted to subsequent
situations. Goldinl2 sees the earliest such adaptation in a tradition
about R. Jochanan ben Zakkai which is preserved in 'Abot R.
Nat 4. 13 Whether or not the account is early or authentic, a
difference in mood with respect to 'Abot 1:2 (3) is evident in the
request R. Jochanan allegedly made of Vespasian following the
siege of Jerusalem. He asked only for Jabneh, that he might go
" ... and teach [his] disciples and there establish a prayer (house)
and perform all the commandments."14
For Goldin, this
formulation represents an attempt to deal with the new situation
by boldly reinterpreting the pillars of Simeon in the aftermath of
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the War of 66-70 c.E. For the Torah, he made central the study
and teaching of Torah; as a substitute for Temple worship (now
impossible) came prayer, or acts like prayer; for deeds of piety,
the Master prescribed acts of lovingkindness.15
In another tradition about R. Jochanan ben Zakkai, likewise
preserved in 'Abot R. Nat. (4 in version A, 8 in B), the sage not
only makes prayer a substitute for Temple service, he also
subordinates it with the third element. On inspecting the ruined
Temple, he comforted the distressed R . Joshua by maintaining (on
the authority of Hos 6:6) that merciful deeds constitute an equally
effective, alternative atonement. 16 The latter tack is continued by
R . Nathan himself. After quoting each of Simeon's dicta (version
A), he expounds the meaning of the pillars seriatim. Once again,
Hos 6:6 provides the warrants for contending that both the study
of Torah and the doing of merciful deeds are superior to burnt
offerings. 17
Although Simeon's formulation was quoted verbatim through
the third century,18 an even farther-reaching adaptation occurred
in the wake of the disastrous wars of 132-135 c.E. In Pirke 'Abot
l: 18 (19), in a formally parallel comment, this tradition is
preserved: "Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: ' On three things the
world stands: on Judgment, and on Truth and on Peace."'19
According to Jacob Neusner, such a statement " ... clearly represents
a post-135 revision of no. 2: The Torah now is truth, a
philosophizing tendency; the Temple service is now replaced by
justice; and deeds of lovingkindness are replaced by peace."20
Thus was the legacy of Simeon the Just preserved and adapted
after 70 c.E. Hos 6:6 played a prominent part in enabling the first
and third of his "pillars" to subordinate the second when
momentous historical events required equally decisive theological
rethinking. Yet, the stream which we have followed had, if we
interpret and appl y the data correctly, another tributary; namely,
that of other Jews who differed with Simeon about the pillars of
religion. And it is to them that we now turn.
IV. 'A BOT AND THE GOSPELS
In the Gospels, although Hos 6:6 is used to subordinate various
cul tic practices (Matt 9: 12, 12:7), it is the conjunction of Deut 6:5
and Lev 19: 18 that subordinates all three of Simeon's pillars.21 H e
had said that the world (or age to come) stands on the Torah.
Jesus declared that both the Law and Prophets themselves "hang"
on the twin commands to love God with one's entire being and
neighbor as oneself (Matt 22:40). Simeon had maintained that the
world stands on the Temple service.
An unknown scribe
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subordinated " ... all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" to the
love commands (Mark 12:33), an analysis which Jesus approved by
pronouncing him "not far" from the Kingdom of God (v 34).
Simeon had opined that the world or age to come stands on acts of
lovingkindness. According to Luke, an anonymous lawyer eager
to inherit eternal life (or life of the age [to come), Zoe aionios )
himself joined these love commands. In the parable of the Good
Samaritan which follows, Jesus urged him to become a neighbor
by performing deeds of mercy even to an enemy in need (10:2537). So, while for Simeon the foundations of existence now and
hereafter were the written revelation, its cultic response, and
merciful interpersonal behavior, the Evangelists portray Jesus and
one guardian-interpreter of Jewish religion as maintaining pointfor-point that greater even than these is wholehearted, boundarytranscending love. In other words, my contention is that the
Synoptic variants, seen against the backdrop of 'Abot 1:2 (3 ),
portray debates among Jews wherein there is an effort to lay
deeper or other foundations for ways of being religious that those
which Simeon the Just had identified. This external evidence
suggests that there was an earlier, or at least another, reason for
the shape of these commandments than is usually offered. Both
kinds of data may enable us to give a richer and fuller account of
their significance.
V. IMPLICATIONS

Redaction
Although we argued above that the evangelists' versions of the
love commands fit their overall redactional purposes, one must not
suppose that they either reflect an exclusive concern or that they
are essentially redactional in nature. There is, in fact, a great deal
of overlap. Like Mark, Matthew is inclined to subordinate cultic
and ceremonial matters to larger issues. So, he has Jesus invoke
Hos 6:6 twice in order to criticize religious leaders for preferring
ceremonial purity to showing mercy towards sinners (9: I 0-12) and
for condemning innocents while maintaining cultic scrupulosity
(12:1-7).
Likewise, Matthew's and Mark's treatment of the encounter
between Jesus and the rich man bears a striking resemblance to
Luke's version of the commandments to love. In both instances,
the quest is for (I) behavior (2) that will eventuate in eternal !ife
(Matt 19:16, Mark 10:17, Luke 18:18. Cf. Luke 19:25). Both
relate Jesus' directive (3) to behave mercifully (giving to the poor
was regarded as a merciful act [Matt 19:21. Cf. 6:2-3 , Mark
10:21, Luke 18:22)). However, Matthew takes the matter another
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step by appending (4) loving one's neighbor as oneself to the
Decalogue (v 19. Cf. Luke 10:27). Finally, Matthew insists that
the disposition towards one's enemy, of the kind exhibited by the
Good Samaritan, mirrors the way in which God loves; and this
enables one to fulfill the command to be teleios as He is (5:4348).22 Thus, the themes are transredactional ones.23
Furthermore, their commonality at this level runs deeper if
one looks at the matter from the perspective of source and form
criticism. The connections just cited span the triple tradition,
Matthew and "L," and "Q" and "L." Moreover, they infuse
logia, apophthegms (specifically, controversy dialogues) and
parable.24 Therefore, both in content and form, the oral and
written tradition portrays Jesus as one whose teaching dealt with
the pillars of religion as these had been formulated by Simeon the
Just and as they were being debated among religious experts of
the day.25

History
Having pursued these themes beyond their redactional level to
the tradition which lay behind it, it now becomes necessary to
press the matter still farther. Does the tradition reflect anything
of the mind, if not the very words of Jesus? Perhaps the best
entry into this complex matter lies via the extent of post-Easter
Christology or soteriology at work.26 One thing seems immediately
clear. The accounts have not undergone the sort of thoroughgoing
Christianization that would have made Jesus the hero in each case.
We recall the strong probability that the two commands had
already been associated in one branch of Judaism a century and a
half before. This is reflected in Luke, where it is the lawyer, not
Jesus, who finds in the love commands the way to eternal life.
Jesus simply urges him to act on what he has just discovered.
Furthermore, in Mark, the sympathetic scribe, not Jesus, elevated
agape over the cultus. Of course, in Matthew and Mark, Jesus
does appear as the first to subordinate the Law (and prophets) to
love for God and neighbor. But He emerges as the chief among
several participants in a debate occurring among Jews and within
Judaism .
Perhaps more significantly, relation to Jesus' person is not
made superior to obeying His teaching here as it is elsewhere in
the Gospels. For example, in Matthew 19, the wealthy young man
comes to Jesus for instruction about good behavior that will get
him a hold on eternal life (v 16). Jesus answers that eschatological
entry into life rests on keeping the commands, specifically the last
five of the Decalogue , to which He adds Lev 19: 18, the command
to love neighbor as self (vv 18-19). In response to the inquisi tor's
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exemplary record of obedience in every respect, and to his sense
of incompleteness (ti eti hystero, v 20), Jesus moves him on to
perfection with the charge to give his earthly treasures to the poor
in exchange for heavenly ones and to follow Him (v 21 ). None of
this occurs in Matthew 22. Nor does it in Luke 10:25-27, in an
analogous circumstance, where, as we saw, it is the interlocutor
who supplies the answer to his own questions about inheriting
eternal life . And Mark resists making Jesus (or allowing himself
to) explain why the scribe, having answered so well in
subordinating the cult to the love commands, is only near to the
kingdom of God (10:33-34).27
Of course, a natural objection will be that such a construct
requires a harmonistic gestalt for these three versions: either that
Jesus addressed the issues of Scripture, cult and ethics on a single
occasion (which the tradition or each evangelist related separatel y)
or that He spoke to each issue at different moments throughout
His career. I am not yet prepared to advocate either, no r can I, as
an historian , rule out either option a priori.
Only a more
thoroughgoing study can say. Whatever the ultimate answers, it
has perhaps become clearer that future analysis of the synoptic
versions of Jesus' teaching about loving God and neighbor ought
to consider the shape and significance of Pirke 'Abot 1:2 (3).
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the Great Supper and the Wedding Feast: History, Redaction and Canon," HBT 8/1
(June 1986): 1-26, esp. pp. 7-11, 13-17.
27. Fuller, Essays, p. 47, lends his support to those who claim that " ...the preference
of the moral law over the sacrificial cult presupposes a Hellenistic-Jewish rather than
rabbinic understanding of the law." A similar point is made by Perkins, Love
Commands, p. 23. However, this view ignores the fact that such a "preference" is as
Hebraic as Hos 6:6 and as rabbinic as Jochanan b. Zakkai and R. Nathan.

Some Observations On
The New Testament Concept
of "Witness"
DONALD G. MILLER
I

"Witness" is a significant New Testament word. M artus occurs
thirty-four times; the verb form martureo appears seventy-nine
times; the nouns marturia and marturion total fifty-seven uses
between them. The concept appears sparingly in the Synoptic
Gospels, but is concentrated in the Johannine literature and the
Acts of the Apostles. This distribution of its usage suggests that it
is a vital aspect of the Church's growth from a local Jerusalem
group to a world-wide movement, and contributed much to the
propagation of the belief that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of
God" through which believers found " life in His name" (John
20:21 ).
Its importance, however, goes beyond statistical considerations.
Its importance lies in its meaning, and in its close affinity to the
nature of the Christian faith as a historic religion. The Christian
faith dawned on the world as a "light shin[ing] in the darkness" of
paganism (John 11:5a; see Eph 6:12), with a power that "delivered
[them] from the dominion of darkness" (Col 1:13a). It came into a
world filled with "many 'gods' and many 'lords"' (1 Cor 8:5b)-those of Mt. Olympus and the temples of Rome, and the deities of
the mystery religions from Egypt such as Isis and Osiris; and many
philosophies--such as Epicureanism and Stoicism which
commanded the loyalties of many for whom the ancient gods had
died. It confronted all this with a simple account of a man named
Jesus in whom, it was claimed, the one, living eternal God had
visited the earth.
Here was something new, something different. The home of
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the Olympian gods was "shut from the sight of men on earth by
clouds."' No one ever shook hands with Zeus. No one ever had
lunch with Jupiter. No one ever rode out a storm in a little boat
with Isis or Osiris. Those deities never wore sandals. Their feet
never touched the earth; they were never soiled by the dust of the
road we walk. But here was a god " who for a little while was
made lower than the angels," who "share[d] in flesh and blood ,"
who was "made like His brethren in every respect" (Heb 2:9a,
I 4a, I 7a). This was not mythology, but history; not fairy tale, but
fact. This was no god " shut from the sight of men by clouds,"
but who was born in the animal stall of an overcrowded inn in a
little village locatable on a map; who was accessible to both the
humble and the great; who was a refugee in Egypt; who lived and
taught on the soil of a Roman province; who had identifiable
disciples, visited identifiable places, ran into trouble with the law
under an identifiable Roman procurator; who was condemned to
death, executed and buried by identifiable friends; and appeared
alive to so me of them following His death and burial.
What is more, this was not an historically isolated
phenomenon , appearing out of the blue without background or
preparat ion. It was vitall y related to a unique series of historic
events wh ich lay behind it. It was a culmination of two thousand
years of Jewish history. While other religions were speculating
abo ut the doings in "the remote heavenly palaces of the gods,"2
the Jews had been observing Yahweh at work in history. As a
colleag ue of mine once remarked , "you never get much heresy
where the Old Testament is central, because it never allows yo u to
get away from history." 3 You cannot escape histo ry in the Old
Testament because it is the record of a historic people and their
experiences on this planet. It has to do with the Pharaohs of
Egypt; with Sennacherib, Sargon and Shalmaneser of Assyria; with
Nebuchadnezzer of C haldea; and Cyrus of Persia. It records the
doings of the ki ngs of Israel and Judah, the activities of living
prophets, the record of whose doings abide until the present. So it
is natural that the Christian faith should keep its roots deeply in
history and not allow itself to get airborne into gnostic
speculations . It is essentially a story of the God who had made
himself known to the " fathers by the prophe ts," now speaki ng His
full and final word "by a Son" (Heb I: I, 2). Christianity is
basically the story of this Son. As Dr. George Arthur Buttrick
once said: " In a sense, yo u can state the Christian faith in six
words: 'The most wonderful thing has happened."' 4
He re is where "witness" in its primary sense became essential.
The story must be told by those who had "witnessed" it. The
elemental meaning of martus is a legal one, where so meone who
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has observed an event, or heard words spoken, or seen the signing
of a deed , appears in court to authenticate such. To witness,
therefore, is to rehearse what one has seen or heard , to verify the
factuality of something.s It was for this reason that the Gospels
were written and ultimately selected by the Church as bearing
essentiall y the "witness" of the apostles, who were described by
Luke as " eyewitnesses" of the things narrated . The importance of
this apostolic "testimony" to what had happened was stressed by
the apostles themselves when, in selecting one to take the place of
the defected Judas "as a witness to [Jesus'] Resurrection," they
insisted that he must be "one of the men who have accompanied
us during all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among
us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day when He
was taken up ..." (Acts 1:21 ). The facts about Jesus were not
m ythological but rather "a narrative [an historic account] of the
things [the events] which have been accomplished [happened,
taken place] among us, just as the y were delivered [handed down]
to us by those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses ..."
(Luke I: I, 2). The "witness" was not just to the Resurrection , but
to the whole story of things that had happened on Palestinian soil
in ongoing historic events, to real people. These "witnesses" were
identifiable human beings, who toiled and sweated over heavy
water-soaked fishing nets, who both collected and paid taxes, who
bartered in market-places, some of whom were " dagger men" who
sought opportunity to dispatch hated Romans or Jewish
collaborators to the other world--all of whom had behind them
the two -thousand-year history of a nation struggling against great
odds for survival in a hostile world, and were not accustomed to
living on mythical imaginings nor hallucinatory visions.
The necessity of the historic witness of the apostles to the
events which had produced the Christian Church was effectively
illustrated many years ago by Professor H. H. Farmer of
Cambridge University. He contrasted Christianity as a historic
religion with a nonhistoric religion such as Hinduism:
It is theoreticall y conceivable that all the sacred books of
Hinduism, and every Hindu, might be utterly destroyed ,
and yet substantially the same religion reappear. .. .Indeed it
would fit harmoniously into the Hindu scheme of thought
to suppose that if Hinduism vanished today it would
reappear tomorrow, fifty years, a thousand years hence.
But were all Christian records and all Christians extirpated,
Christianity could not recur again . In its occurrence ...
without a witness, it would flatly contradict all that it had
To put it paradoxically, in
always claimed to be.
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happening again it would show that it had never, according
to its own definition of itself, happened at all.6

Christianity rests on a story of events. If nobody knew the
events, nobody could be a Christian.
For this reason, each
generation must return to the Scriptures. The Bible will always
remain central to the Church's witness, for it contains the story
which brought the Church into being and will continue to nourish
it to the end. The difference between the apostolic generation and
all subsequent generations is that they could speak of that "which
we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have
looked upon and touched with our hands" (I John 1: I), whereas
the others must repeat a story at which they themselves were not
present. The Fourth Gospel points the dividing line between those
who, like Thomas, had believed because they had "seen" and
"those who have not seen and yet believe" (John 20:29).
II

But the apostles "witness" in yet another sense of the word.
Strathmann has pointed out that both in classical Greek and in the
Septuagint, martus and its cognates are frequently used in the
secondary sense of attestation of truth rather than mere f act .7 The
"witness" interprets the hidden meaning of observable realities.
The second Isaiah speaks of Israel as a "witness" to "the people
who are blind, yet have eyes, who are deaf, yet have ears" (43:8).
Because Israel knows and believes and understands that " before
[Yahweh] no god was formed, nor shall there be any after" Him ,
they are to "witness" this to those who know it not. They are to
interpret to others the meaning of God's action with them .
Events do not always carry their significance in themselves.
They must be interpreted. For example, had one, ignorant of
baseball, been taken to Forbes Field in Pittsburgh in the Fall of
1960 to see the last game of the World Series, he would have seen
men, in batting practice before the game, hitting with a wooden
club a small white sphere which occasionally went over the fence.
This would have been just an illustration of the mechanical force
of propulsion over gravity. When, however, in the last of the
ninth inning, with two outs and the Pittsburgh Pirates behind , a
little chap named Mazeroski, whose propulsive habits were at best
questionable, propelled the little sphere over the fence , the
uninitiated onlooker would not have understood why the crowd
responded with fits of near insanity. One would have had to
interpret the event to him to give it any meaning. The incident
ended the game with a sudden, unexpected reversal of the winning
side; it installed the Pirates as world champions; it added a fat
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paycheck to the yearly earnings of the hitter and his teammates,
and by that much reduced the paychecks of their Yankee
opponents; it put Pittsburgh on the sports map and caused every
sports writer in the world to write about it; and it gave habitual
drunkards a better reason for getting drunk than they had had for
some time. To understand the significance of an event, it is
necessary to set it in a context of meaning .
The necessity of this in the realm of faith may be seen in the
case of the Ethiopian eunuch who was reading the scroll of the
prophet Isaiah as his chariot carried him home from a pilgrimage
to Jerusalem. "Do you understand what you are reading?" asked
Philip.
"How can I," he replied , "unless some one guides
[explains, teaches) me?" Then we are told, "Philip opened his
mouth, and beginning with this scripture he told him the good
The story of Jesus must be
news of Jesus" (Acts 8:30ff).
interpreted. It could be just a story of a starry-eyed young
Jewis h man who fell afoul of the authorities in a good cause and
found what many reformers have found, that it doesn't pay to
stick one's neck out too far. Or, it could be the story of the
coming of the eternal God in a unique, decisive incursion into
human history, to redeem the world from its thralldom to evil.
The event itself must be understood in its context of meaning.
The facts themselves are not enough.
A recent British writer has fulminated against Edward Gibbon
as a "pseudo-historian." Of him the writer says:
Accurate in every statement of his work, there has lived
no individual writer responsible for a greater volume of
inferential falsehood .... Following his method, there might
be compiled with equal regard for fact and disdain of the
truth, a chronicle of the American continent from the
sexual shortcomings of transatlantic presidents, fortified by
an implicit belief in the veracity of the Hearst press.s
In order to avoid "inferential falsehood," with a high "regard for
fact" but a "disdain of the truth," the Church set up the canon of
the Scriptures as the authoritative guide to all future developing
tradition . In so doing, it did not impart any authority to the
Scriptures- -it merely recognized the innate apostolic authority of
the interpretation of the sacred events contained therein, by which
it had been brought into being and under which its subsequently
developing tradition was to be controlled.9 Those in the apostolic
generation , therefore, were the indispensable and decisive
"witnesses" both to the fact s which underlie our faith and to the
m eaning of those facts for faith.
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III

But the "witness" did not stop with that generation. There is
a broader sense in which all Christians are " witnesses." They
"echo" the original witness of the apostles by rehearsing the facts
they recounted and by reiterating the apostolic interpretation of
those facts. Timothy, for example, was a non-Palestinian Greek
who never knew Jesus in the Flesh, but Paul counseled him, "Do
not be ashamed then of testifying to our Lord" (2 Tim I:8a). He
was obviously free, in his testifying, to go beyond mere
catechetical repetition of apostolic teaching, but in using his own
words he was to follow "the pattern of the sound words" which
he had heard from Paul and to "guard the truth" which had been
entrusted to him by the Holy Spirit who dwelt within him (2 Tim
I: I 3f). He was not to create new truth, but to rehearse truth
which had been entrusted to him by Paul and others. Even Paul,
although he was a direct witness to the Resurrection by having
been granted a post-Resurrection appearance of Jesus (Acts 22:6f;
26: I 2ff; Gal I: I Sf; I Cor 9: l, 15:8), was dependent on the
"witness" of the other apostles as to the historic facts of our
Lord's earthly life. When he described the Lord's Supper, he
could only pass on the tradition he had "received." He speaks of
receiving it "from the Lord," but the entire passage suggests that
he does not mean that it had been divinely revealed to him, but
had come to him through a tradition at the beginning of which
stands the historical Jesus.10 So the entire Christian community is
engaged in "witness" as the tradition is received and passed on
from generation to generation.
As a guide to the content of what that witness should be, it is
instructive to examine the New Testament descriptions of the
apostolic witness . To what, or to whom, were they witnessing ?
What was the content of their testimony? As we have seen , their
central and unique attestation can be made by subsequent
generations only in a secondary sense- -by rehearsing their primary
witness to the Resurrection of Jesus.
In Peter's sermon to
Cornelius, he affirmed that "God raised (Jesus] on the third day
and made Him manifest, not to all the people but to us who were
chosen by God as witnesses ..." (Acts 10:40a; italics mine). Paul
confirms the uniqueness of the apostolic witness to the
Resurrection when, in listing the series of post-Resurrection
appearances, he lists the appearance to him as "last of all" ( I Cor
I 5:8a); that is, the last in a series after which there are to be no
more . No emotional experiences, or alleged appearances of the
risen Christ to sub-apostolic people, therefore, are to be c redited
as genuine post-Resurrection appearances commensurate with what
happened to those "who were chosen by God as witnesses" to the
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Resurrection. We must depend on the apostolic "witness" at this
point; not subsequent occult experiences. When, therefore, we
hear of experiences such as that of the late Bishop Pike, who
apparently having reservations about the apostolic testimony to the
Resurrection, wanted us to believe in the life beyond because of
certain occult communications he had with his deceased son, we
cannot incorporate such experiences into the tradition of genuine
Christian testimony. They are alien to normative Christianity. At
this point the apostolic "witness" is final. We are driven back on
it--or nothing. Subsequent generations can only recapitulate their
testimony.
But in echoing the apostolic testimony to Jesus' Resurrection,
the re-presentation of succeeding generations must include the
context in which that testimony was made. Granted the fact of
the Resurrection witnessed solely by the apostles, subsequent
generations must present along with it the accompany ing apostolic
train of thoug ht. They can, for example, follow Paul in testifying
to the consequences of failing to believe that Christ has been
raised; to the significance of Christ's Resurrection as "first fruits"
of the hope of our own resurrection as His final triumph over
death; and to the nature of the mystery involved in the "spiritual
body" which Paul contrasts with the "physical body" we now
possess (see I Cor 15: l 2f). A part of the apostolic "witness" in
which subsequent generations may share, too, is found in the
Lukan setting where the witness to the Resurrection is related to
its background in the Old T estament Scriptures , with the Suffering
Servant as the key to understanding the preparation for the event,
and the consequent implication " that repentance and forgiveness
of sins should be preached in His name to all nations" (Luke
24:26f, 44ff). Guidance is found also in Peter's word to Cornelius
when he insisted that the apostles were commissioned not only to
"witness" to "all that He did both in the country of the Jews and
in Jerusalem," and to His "death by hanging ... on a tree," and to
the fact that "God raised Him on the third day," but also "to
testify that He is the one ordained by God to be the judge of the
living and the dead" because "all the prophets bear witness that
every one who believes in Him receives forgiveness of sins
through His name" (Acts 10:39ff). This is all part of the apostolic
"witness" which all subsequent generations must re-present till
"the last syllable of recorded time."
But note that this "witness" is always focused on Jesus and
what God has accomplished through him, not on subjective
"experience" as an outcome of believing this. Their "experience"
never became their "gospel." As Paul said, "what we preach is
not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord ..." (2 Cor 4:5a). Paul
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rehearsed his experience with the risen Christ on the road to
Damascus in Acts 22 and 26 in testifying to the fact that Christ
was alive, in establishing his commission to "be a witness for Him
to all men" of what he had "seen and heard" (22:15b, 26:16b), and
in insisting on his status as an apostle (Gal 1:11-2:10); but the
normal focus of his evangelistic witnessing was not on his own
experience but on the death and Resurrection of Jesus as the
fulfillment of the prophetic message of the Old Testament.
Paul's first recorded sermon in the synagogue at Antioch was
not a description of his conversion, nor a word about his own
inner spiritual life. It was a rehearsal of Jewish history from the
Exodus, through David , to John the Baptist; an affirmation " that
what God promised to the fathers, this He has fulfilled to us their
children by raising Jesus"; and the conclusion that "every one that
believes is freed from everything from which you could not be
freed by the law of Moses" through the "forgiveness of sins"
(Acts l3:16ff). In his defense before Agrippa, Paul describes his
ministry as "testifying both to small and great, saying nothing but
what the prophets and Moses said would come to pass: that the
Christ must suffer, and that, by being the first to rise from the
dead, He would proclaim light both to the people [the Jews] and
to the Gentiles" (Acts 26:22f). Paul also counseled Timothy: "Do
not be ashamed then of testifying to our Lord ... who abolished
death and brought life and immortality to light through the
Gospel" (2 Tim 1:5a, l Ob). Timothy was not urged to share with
his hearers the latest state of his religious emotions, nor the
content of some spiritual vision he had recently had , nor his own
ideas about God, nor some alleged word spoken to him b y God
during his morning devotions, but to affirm that God in Christ
had destroyed man's last enemy--death, and that because of that
we may be "more than conquerors through Him who loved us,"
from whose love nothing "in all creation can separate us" (Rom
8:37ff).
As Eugene H. Peterson has aptly stated: "When we
witness we do not unpack the contents of our own emotional
suitcases for the titillation of voyeurs, we point to what God has
revealed." 11
Many who follow the "experience-centered" method of
Christian witness by continually relating their own experiences of
grace, claim John Wesley as their mentor. I am wondering how
correct they are. Although I am not an expert on Wesle y, I have
read rather widely in his writings, and do not recall one single
reference to his "Aldersgate" experience save the one description
of it in his Journal. It did not seem to become his "gospel." And
when, in many other passages in his Journal, he relates so me
remarkable instance of providence in preserving him from harm
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on his countless journeys to preach, there is no evidence that these
experiences were recounted in his sermons, or used as evangelistic
tools. It has been said of his sermons that one could develop a
good systematic theology from them , because they are directed to
an exposition of the faith rather than rehearsals of his experience
of the faith.
P. T. Forsyth made a distinction between "the experience ... of
redemption" and "the experience of a redeemer. Because it is not
the sense of the experience that is the main matter, but the s ource
of the experience, and its content. It is not our experience we are
conscious of--that would be self-conscious piety--but it is Christ.
It is not our experience we preach , but the Christ who comes in
our experience." 12 One of the rarest and most treasured graces
possible in Christian experience is genuine humility.
The
humblest man I ever knew would have been surprised if one had
asked him how he became humble. He would probably have
answered that he had never thought of himself as humble. It was
his experience of Christ that made him humble, not his experience
of humility. And what made him humble was that he was so
obsessed with Christ, and service to him, that it never occurred to
him to analyze his own experience, or talk of it. He could not
have written the bestseller I once heard of, entitled Humility and
How I Attained It! On the other hand, I think that perhaps the
proudest man I ever saw was one who argued that God never asks
anything of us that we are unable to attain. If asked whether he
really, at all times without exception, kept the second great
commandment, "Thou shalt love thy love thy neighbor as thyself,"
he likely would have answered "Yes!"
I once heard Professor Eduard Schweizer, of Zurich, illustrate
in a lecture the difference between the objective and the
subjective quality of human experience. He said: "I ask you,
'What happened at the theater last Friday evening?' If you should
reply, 'Oh, it was wonderful! I was deeply moved! Chills went
up and down my spine, my eyes were filled with tears; I have
never experienced such an exalted mood before in my whole life!'
I should have to reply, 'But you haven't answered my question. I
did not ask what happened to you, but what happened at the
theater?'" If what happened there could produce such a marked
response, testimony to the response might indeed encourage the
hearer to go the play to find out for himself, but it would be the
play it self and not someone else's experience of the play which
would be crucial. A ware of this, when William Carey was visited
on his deathbed by his younger colleague, Alexander Duff, and
Duff recounted the many contributions Carey had made to India
through his life, Carey replied: "Mr Duff, ... when I am gone say
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nothing about Dr. Carey--speak about Dr. Carey's Saviour." 13
This has two important concomitants. First, if one rest o ne's
faith on experience rather than the source of his experience, it is
difficult to know whose experience should be normative. On a
visit to the Mormon Tabernacle a few years ago, I picked up a
tract written by a female deep sea diver, accompanied by a very
enticing photograph. It was her testimony. She had been taking
instruction in the Mormon faith for some months when suddenl y,
in a deep dive many feet below the surface of the water, the truth
of the Mormon persuasion was clearly revealed to her and she
experienced the meaning of life through that revelation in a way
that solved all her problems and made her a radia nt and
triumphant believer. If one rests one's case on experience, wh y is
not her experience as valid as anyone else's? And most certainly,
the Christian Science appeal rests quite solidly on Mrs. Edd y's
testimony to her "healing" and on that of subsequent followers . If
the retelling of religious experiences is the best me thod of
propagating religious faith, then it would seem that those
approached would be in the position of consumers influenced by
advertising who are left to pick and choose that which is most
appealing. On the other hand, to present the proposal of Jesus
alongside others, to examine carefully the long history leading up
to Him in the old Testament, to expose one's self to the appeal of
His character, claims and teachings in the light of the character ,
claims and teachings of others, along with the apostolic testimo ny
to His death and Resurrection (which involve truths claimed for
no other religious leader), furnishes a more solid basis for belief
than the states of feelings or the religious experiences claimed by
His followers. The ultimate question for faith must be: Is He
trustworthy? Conceivably, under the influence of drugs one could
have a feeling of emotional euphoria while drowning. On the
other hand, a young man might experience all the normal
emotional terror of drowning until he was unconscious, yet be
saved by a strong swimmer who rescues him, pumps the water out
of his lungs, and restores him to wholeness. The issue in a
drowning crisis is not how does one feel, but what is the
capability of the rescuer? Luther wrote to one in this ve in when,
eschewing all supports from experience, he rested his hope fully
on the adequacy of Christ.
And I, my loving Brentius ...do use to think in this manner,
namely, as if in my heart were no quality or virtue at all
which is called faith or love, but I set all on Christ , and
say, my formalis justitia, that is, my sure, my constan t
and complete righteousness, in which there is no want or
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failing, but is as before God it ought to be, is Christ my
Lord and Savior.14
Second, Dora Greenwell, in a classic devotional book, The
Patience of Hope, written over a century and a quarter ago, raised
the issue of the spiritual uncertainty of a faith which rests on
subjective experience rather than on Him who is the source of
that experience. If faith rests on experience, then that faith is
shaky when the experience cools, and thus one's confidence is put
at the mercy of one's changing emotional states, or subjected to
the functioning of the liver or endocrine glands. Greenwell wrote:
Certain systems lay a pressure upon the subjective side
greater than the spirit of man is at all times able to bear;
working out all things from the depths of individual
consciousness, as if truth were not there at all until they are
(manifestly) there for us.
She gently chided Wesley, who though he laudably "felt and
preached Christ both freely and fully," yet by giving "central
importance ... to conscious spiritual work in men" tended, in some
degree, "to withdraw the soul's eye from Christ, to fix it upon
what is going on within itself."15
This criticism was based on Wesley's early views, expressed
frequently but especially clearly in a letter in which he says that
he insists "in all my writings, and in all my preaching" on a
subjective assurance, a "perceptible inspiration," of one's standing
with Christ.
We mean that inspiration of God's Holy Spirit, whereby He
fills us with righteousness, peace, and joy, with love to
Him and all mankind. And we believe it cannot be, in the
nature of things, that a man should be filled with
this ... without perceiving it as clearly as he does the light of
the sun. 16
Although, as we have seen, Wesley did not use Christian
experience as the basis of faith, it is clear from these and other
statements that he used it as evidence of the reality of one's faith.
If one were not subjectively assured of one's saving relation to
Christ, it was doubtful whether he or she had such a relationship.
The evidence for faith that one is reconciled to God does not then
rest ultimately on what Christ has done, but on one's
"perceiving ... as clearly as he does the light of the sun" that he is
filled with "righteousness, peace, and joy" and with "love to
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[God] and all mankind."
Dora Greenwell apparently did not know, nor do a good many
followers of Wesley, that in later years he seemed to recant this
stern insistence on a subjective assurance. On March 28, 1768,
when Wesley was sixty-five years of age, he wrote to Thomas
Rutherforth, Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge
University:
I believe a consciousness of being in ... favour ... is the
common privilege of Christians fearing God and working
righteousness. Yet I do not affirm there are no exceptions
to this general rule. Possibly some may be in the favour
of God, and yet go mourning all the day long. But I
believe this is usually owing either to disorder of body or

ignorance of gospel promises.
Therefore I have not for many years thought a
consciousness of acceptance to be essential to justifying
faith. 17
On March 9, 1782, when Wesley was seventy-nine years of age, he
wrote to Ann Loxdale, who was having difficulty with her
Christian experience, complaining "But I am not increasing in the
divine life":
That is your mistake . Perhaps you are now increasing
therein faster than ever you did since you were justified. It
is true that the usual method of our Lord is to purify us
by joy in the Holy Ghost and a full consciousness of His
love. But I have known several exempt cases, and I am
clearly satisfied yours is one ....1s
But even more startling is Wesley's confession to his brother,
Charles, when he was sixty-three years of age:
And yet this is the mystery, I do not love God. I never
did. Therefore I never believed in the Christian sense of
the word. Therefore I am only an honest heathen, a
proselyte of the Temple, one of the phoboumenoi ton
theon ... .I have no direct witness, I do not say that I am a
child of God .... 19
Able interpreters of Wesley have attributed this strange statement
to Wesley's physical condition at the time it was made, brought on
by overwork and strain.20
To the extent that such an
interpretation is valid, it would seem to confirm the fact that to
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the degree that one's confidence of acceptance with God rests on
subjective experience, to that degree one is put at the mercy of
his or her physical makeup.
Wesley was a sufficiently great man to change his mind when
convinced that he had been mistaken.
Apparently, in his
maturity, through further study of the Scriptures and a deeper
understanding of the ups and downs of the struggle of faith, he
discovered , with Luther, that faith rests solely on Christ, and that
one may be held by Christ even when his own awareness of that is
dim. I believe he would finally have agreed with Dora Greenwell:
Happy for us, if Christ can look [at us) and find His own
image reflected, however faintly; but we must look at Him,
at the sun in the heavens, not at the sun in the brook, its
broken and ever-varying reflection. So long as we are
resting in anything within ourselves, be it even in a work
of grace, there remains, at least to honest hearts, a ground
for continual restlessness and continual disappointment. To
know that we have nothing, are nothing, out of Christ, is
to know the truth which makes us free. 21
In this vein, P.T. Forsyth says:
In your faith you are more conscious and sure of Him than
you are of your faith. For your faith, you well know, may
fail Him, but you know still better that He will not fail
your faith. And you are more conscious and sure of Him,
as the source and cause of your experience, than you are
of the experience itself, which you forget to think of. The
very apostles never asked us to believe their experience,
nor to believe on the ground of it, but to believe with
them in Christ. 22
IV
There is one further aspect of "witness" in the New Testament
that should not be overlooked. It is the nonverbal testimony of
the Christian community manifested by their commitment to the
truths they profess. The facts on which faith is based, and the
unique interpretation of the meaning of those facts which faith
gives, is embodied in a life lived in commitment to those facts and
the truths they imply. This does not mean that these facts and
their meaning are irrelevant if not adequately embodied in a
committed community. If that were so, Christian truth would
have vanished long ago in the light of the failure of both Israel
and the Church to embody their faith. The very judgment of God
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brought on by the lapses, however, is itself a witness that they
should not have occurred, and God's faithfulness both to Israel
and the Church is witness to the truth they often fail to embody.
This is clear in the Old Testament where Israel's survival of the
judgment of the Exile becomes a "witness" to the nations of the
God by whom they survived. Israel's very existence after the
Exile made them "witnesses" to Yahweh's saving purpose and His
lordship of history (Isa 53:9ff). So the very existence of the
Christian community, in spite of its lapses and failures and
weaknesses and denials, bears witness to the God to whom it is
committed and testifies to the fact that the truth by which it li ves
is greater than it is. The Church is summoned to live by the faith
which it professes, and to the extent that its failure to do so is
willful and blatant, it is under the judgment of God . But the God
to whom the Church witnesses is greater than it is, and will not
" leave himself without witness" even when the Church fails Him .
Years ago I heard Dr. George W. Richards tell of E. Stanley
Jones asking Gandhi what he would like him to tell the American
Christians when he visited America. Gandhi replied: "Tell them
to live their religion ." Dr. Richards remarked that this indicated
Gandhi's failure to understand the Christian faith. This was a
modern repetition of the old Pharisaic notion that if all Israelites
would only keep the law for twenty-four hours, Messiah would
come . This would place the achievement of God's purpose in the
hands of men rather than in the will of God . It manifests, too, a
faulty estimate of the tragedy of the human situation, ass um ing
that by human effort, even on the part of good and devout
people, the kingdom of God can be established on the earth and
the ravages of the human condition be overcome. Karl Bart h
frequently quoted the phrase: Die providentia et hominum
confusione.
The providence of God and the confusion, or
bungling , of people--even good people--accounts for history. T he
purpose of God for humankind is too great ever to be perfectly
embodied in history, either in the life of individuals or the
structures of society. Utopians, both secular or sacred , hold out
false hopes. There will never be a time when we shall not have to
continue praying, "Thy kingdom come," so long as history lasts.
The kingdom will come as God's gift in His own way and time.
Committed persons do not achieve it, but bear witness to its
co:ning because God is God, and they seek to live now--though
failing at every turn--in a way that will be commensurate with
that kingdom when it comes.
Browning's familiar saying, "A man's reach should exceed his
grasp, or what's a heaven for?" puts it well . But a genuinely
believing person keeps reaching and, aware with Paul that he or

Some Observations On The New Testament Concept of "Witness"

69

she is not "already at the goal," presses on "toward the goal for
the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus {Phil 3: 13 ).
And even an imperfect effort to live one's faith, to the degree
that a person is genuinely penitent, is a silent witness to that truth
which is greater than human achievement. Discerning people can
distinguish between a willful flaunting of the Christian ideal--the
fraudulent attitude that says, "let us sin that grace may abound"-and the authentic failure of a high-minded struggler after
righteousness. The life-commitment of a believer to the truth he
or she attests, and the effort in the long history of the Church to
read the meaning of the judgments of God upon it and to renew
its life accordingly, are eloquent "witness" to the fact that God is
at work in the world through His Church and that He speaks to
"those who have ears to hear."
John Calvin once suggested that in the liturgy of the Church
the Gloria in excelsis be replaced by a recital of the Ten
Commandments, thus witnessing that confessing a true desire to
live by them would be the best way to glorify God. The supreme
commitment of life to the glory of God is a mighty witness to
Him.

v
This leads to the ultimate in "witness"--the laying down of
one's life for God's glory. The New Testament applies the word
"witness" to Jesus in the laying down of His life {I Tim 6: 13),
and twice in the Revelation applies it to those who had died
martyrs' deaths (2: 13, 17:6).
This usage of martus became
customary in the early centuries to designate those who gave their
lives for the Christian faith, and has now passed into our English
language as "martyr." This eloquent "witness" of those who died
for Christ rather than live without Him became one of the most
effective testimonies to the One for whom they died, and made a
great contribution to the final triumph of the faith over paganism.
This was perhaps the most effective witness that could be made to
the lordship of Jesus, either then or now.
Such witness is foreign to our present Western experience, but
it is startling to think that in other parts of the world more people
have died for Christ in our generation than in any other since the
Christian era began. I do not refer to those who have died in
wars ostensibly fighting to save what we think of as Christian
civilization, but people who have been martyred in cold blood in
peacetime simply because they dared openly to confess faith in
Christ. In a world that has grown increasingly secular and pagan,
where the Church's witness has in many areas been weakened by
compromise and accommodation to the surrounding culture, the
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witness of martyrdom may be the means by which the world will
once more be conquered by the faith. And that sort of witness
can never be a self-conscious effort to turn persons' attention to
the one who makes the sacrifice. No martyr expires saying,
"Look at me and see my courage in dying," but rather silently
testifies to Him whose "head was crowned with thorns, and that
face that was spit upon" for him or her.
One last word. The New Testament makes it clear that no
"witness" can be effectively made to the world, either by word or
by !ife, that is not empowered by the Holy Spirit. Conversely, no
"witness" can be heard or rightly interpreted apart from the aid

of the Holy Spirit. All our efforts to be or to speak are vain save
as they are "begun, continued, and ended" in Him.
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John 20:22, Once More
ROBERT W. LYON
According to the Fourth Gospel, on the Sunday evening of the
Resurrection--on Easter evening--Jesus appears to His disciples
behind closed doors. After His greeting of peace, He confirms
His identity by showing them His hands and His side. Then,
following a commissioning word the text records that "He
breathed upon them and said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit."' This, in
turn, is followed by the logion granting authority to the
community with respect to the promise of forgiveness (John
20:21-23).
The question that always arises in the examination of this text
is how this Easter evening event of the insufflation of the Spirit
relates to the Pentecost experience recorded in Acts 2: 1- 4. Three
general types of explanations are commonly offered, though with
significant variations within these three types.
To begin with, many speak of two separate bestowals of the
Spirit: the first one on Easter evening as recorded in the Fourth
Gospel, and the second at Pentecost as we find in Acts 2. The
two e vents are separated by fifty days during which the Ascension
took place . At first glance this seems to be the most natural
interpretation. But for those advocating this interpretation , the
agreement ends immediately. The purpose, meaning and impact
of the two events are variously explained . Chrysostom (fourthfifth century) related John 20 to the forgiveness of sins, while the
event of Acts 2 empowered the church to perform miracles and to
raise the dead . 1 Others propose that John 20 concerns individuals
in their relationship to the Father, whereas Acts 2 is characterized
as ecclesiastical and missionary.2 James M . Boice sees John 20 as
especially for the apostolate, while Acts 2 is the promised general
outpouring upon the Church.3 H. B. Swete views the latter
experience as the sending of the person of the Paraclete , while the
Easter event meant the "inspiriting" of his life.4 Westcott concurs
with the distinction set out by F. Godet: John answers to the
power of the Resurrection, the other to the power of the
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Ascension.s That is, one brought the grace of quickening, the
other that of enduement. Regarding the two-fold bestowal, E. C.
Hoskyns writes, "What the Lord will do invisibly from heaven He
here does visibly on earth. The mission is inaugurated but not
actually begun .... The actual beginning of the mission lies outside
the scope of the Fourth Gospel. There remains, therefore, room
for the Pentecostal outpouring."6 Leon Morris does not define the
difference between the two events, but says only that John tells us
of one gift and Luke another. 7 J. A. Bengel, followed not
surprisingly by John Wesley, sees John 20 as transitional and
anticipatory, an arrha of Pentecost.8 James D. G. Dunn, in a very
thorough and judicious discussion, concludes that for the
disciples--and only for them--the baptism of the Spirit (Acts 2)
"was a second and distinct work of the Spirit in the spiritual

experience of the first disciples." 9 He further delineates the
distinctions between the two experiences by saying that the former

enables the disciples to experience the recreative breath of God
(which, he says, was only possible after the Crucifixion/
Resurrection), whereas Acts 2 is the giving of the Spirit according
to promise and after the Ascension.
These proposals all have one thing in common, namely the
recognition that only Acts 2 represents the actual fulfillment of
the promise first declared by John the Baptist10 and repeated by
Jesusll that the followers of Jesus would be baptized in the Holy
Spirit. The particular appeal of this way of interpreting the two
passages is the way the two accounts by John and Luke dovetail so
well, thereby removing many historical and other problems.
A second approach to the two texts was offered as early as the
sixth century by Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose view was later
condemned by the Second Council of Constantinople in A.o. 553.u
It was suggested that in John 20 the disciples did not really have
an experience of the Spirit. Rather, Jesus acted only figuratively
and by way of promise. The words were purely symbolic of a
future gift.
The expression was proleptic.
For some
representatives of this interpretation, part of the argument has
involved the suggestion that the aorist labete equals the future
though those who advocate this approach would not
rest their case entirely on that proposal. This understanding of
John 20 was espoused also in the seventeenth century by Hugo
Grotiusl3 and a century later by August Tholuck. 14 Two more
recent conservatives have also sought to maintain this position.
Theodor Zahn suggested that the anarthrous expression pneuma
hagion points to the symbolic form of the gift. 15 "The symbolic
event (Ger., Handlung) is, therefore, only a drastic renewing of
the promise given earlier in words that the exalted Jesus would
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send them the Holy Spirit."16 In our own time, G. E. Ladd has
asserted that there was only one gift, the one recounted in Acts 2,
and that John 20 is "acted parable promissory and anticipatory to
the actual coming of the Spirit at Pentecost."17 He derives this in
part from the meaning of John 7:39 that the Spirit could not be
given until after the Ascension, as well as from the fact that there
is no evidence that the disciples entered into their mission until
after Pentecost.
This second option is particularly attractive because it supports
all the rest of the New Testament witness that there is only one
bestowal of the Spirit, though that bestowal is described through a
variety of metaphors . Those who support this interpretation of
John 20 tend to view all explanations of the two-fold bestowal as
artificial, unconvincing and unnecessary. The historicity of Acts 2
is not challenged. Therefore, John 20 is to be seen as something
other than an actual bestowal.
This leads us to the third option, namely, that we ha ve only
one bestowal of the Spirit upon the disciples and that John 20 is
the writer's own highly theologized version of Acts 2, what is
called "the Johannine Pentecost." This view is seldom espoused
by conservative scholars who tend to view the historical problems
as insurmountable. On the other hand, it seems to be a view
assumed as obvious or inevitable b y others. C. K. Barrett, 18 C. H .
Dodd,19 R. H . Fuller,20 C. F. D. Moule, 21 Adolf Schlatter22 and
Kirsopp Lake23 are representative of those who regard the two
texts as divergent traditions of the same event, though some would
see different emphases in each. Alfred Loisy goes a step farther
when he suggests that John is correcting Luke by substituting the
Resurrection gift for the Pentecostal gift.24
To Barrett, it is impossible to harmo nize the two accounts, a
view which probably explains why few conservatives have
supported the idea that John and Luke can both be reporting the
same event. The historical incongruencies are quite obvious: (a)
the Johannine e ven t takes place Easter evening, whereas in Acts it
takes place fift y days later; (b) the Johannine bestowa l is by the
risen but not yet ascended Lord, while for Luke the Spirit is given
after Jesus is seated at the right hand of the Father (2:33 ); ( c)
Thomas is present in Acts 2 but absent in John 20; and (d) it is
also quite possible that the hoi mathetai of John 20: 19 refers only
to the inner circle of the immediate disciples (as at the Last
Supper) whereas Luke has 120 gathered at Pentecost.is Do these
incongruencies doom the prospects of this option? We shall come
back to that question.
How do we choose from among these three options?
To
resolve the problem of this passage and its relation to Acts 2, we
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must begin with one fundamental principle of interpretation ,
namel y, that we must read John according to John and not throug h
Lukan lenses. We cannot impose one author on another; we must
let John speak for himself. Though we will still have to face the
task of relating the text of John to that of Acts, we must fi rs t
read John according to John.
With this principle in mind, it seems that the second of the
three options has the least appeal precisely because it is an attempt
to understand John's text within the framework of Ac ts 2.
Neither the argument that labete = li!mpsesthe or the suggestion
that the anarthrous pneuma hagion carries a special s ignificance
has been convincing. But beyond that, this particular reading of
the text is not suggested by anything in the text no r by any
literary, philological or theological feature of the Fourth Gospel.
It derives entirely from the existence of th e account in Acts 2.
Reading J o hn by itself, as the primitive Johannine community and
perhaps ot hers might have done, we probably would not even
propose this explanation of the text. It is proposed e ntirel y in th e
light of Acts 2. Nothing in the text itself would indicate that o n
that Easter evening the disciples did not receive the Hol y Spirit.
Perhaps the only thing th at commends this option is that it rightl y
recognizes the witness of the rest of the New Testa ment in
ac knowledging only one bestowal of the Spirit. And it rejects the
idea that the case of the disciples was different. As we s hall see,
there is another and better way of interpreting the text while
e ndors ing the "o ne bestowal" motif of the New Testament.
The popularity of the first option , namel y, of two separate
bes towals o r experiences of the Spirit, suggests it mus t be take n
serious ly. It cannot be dismissed simpl y because it is looked at as
a necessary approach in view of the desire to prese rve the
a uthe nticity of the historical narratives of Scripture. This first
optio n (two bestowals) is not purely an apology for Sc ripture,
though for some interpreters this may well be a large part of what
moti va tes th e ir approach. James D . G. Dunn, who s urely has no
desi re to protect the historicity of the na rratives, cautio us ly adopts
this interpretation.26 Though he acknowledges the real possibilit y
of the third o ption, ultimately his conclusion seems to be rooted
largely , though not exclusively, in John 7:39: "for the Spirit had
not yet been given , because Jesus had not yet been glorified."
The sa me theme is conveyed in 16:7; the departure of Jesus is
important, it is "for your good" because only then can th e Spirit
be gi ve n . Though man y have argued for an ascens ion of Jesus
between 20: 17 and 20: 19, so that the insufflation of verse 22
would indeed be by the ascended Lord (and so dovetailing with
Acts 2), Dunn is not persuaded that the Ascension has taken place
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in John's narrative. Therefore 20:22 cannot be the fulfillment of
the promises in chapters 14-16.
Dunn regards 20:22 as the moment of new birth for the
disciples. This could take place, he maintains, only after the
Resurrection . He rightly views the disciples as the people of the
transition between dispensations . In this transition period , he
identifies three decisi ve milestones.
Prior to the death/
Resurrection of Jesus, the Word dominated their experience and
by it they were cleansed (13: 10; 15:3). But until the Resurrection
they could not experience new birth, which occurs in 20:22. Then
in the third milestone at Pentecost they experience the promise of
the Father.
The first milestone, then, is before the death/
Resurrection of Jesus; the second, new birth, is after the
Resurrection when for the first time the y become Christians; the
third, at Pentecost, is when they truly experience the promised
baptism of the Spirit. This construct of the disciples' experience
has much to commend it, but it raises several serious questions.
First, it employs the language and categories of later Christian
theology to treat the experience of the disciples.
Dunn
acknowledges that from Acts 2:38 on we have only the one
expe rience of new birth--incorporat ion into the Body of Christ,
salvation--upon the occasion of receiving, or being baptized in,
the Holy Spirit. But then he employs the term "conversion"
(p . 179) and notes that the cleansing spoken of in J3: I 0 and 15:3
cannot mean that the disciples were converted. Conversion, he
affirms, took place in 20:22 at the experience of "new birth ." But
it is surely a vexing question as to when the disciples were
converted. As to the metaphor of cleansing, E. P. Sanders has
noted that in some places in rabbinic literature the term "cleanse"
means "atone."27 This would suggest some sort of relationship
between the disciples and Jesus (and the Father), perhaps
involving forgiveness, reconciliation and other terms more
associated with Paul. Can one be forgiven , in terms of the new
dispensation in Christ, and not be a Christian? Further, John 17:9
suggests that they are Christians before Jesus' death. "I pray for
them; I am not praying for the world but for those whom you
have given to me, because they belong to you" [italics mine). In
addition, the word "already" in 15:3 prevents us from interpreting
the verse proleptically . Can it be said that people who, through
the ministry of Jesus, belong to God and who have been cleansed
by the Word are not in some sense of the word Christians?
Again, it is said that prior to the death/ Resurrection of Jesus
the cleansing is by virtue of the Word (dia ton logon), and that
this is a qualitatively different experience from the new life and
new birth through the receiving of the Spirit. While it is true that
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the language of "life" is linked with the Spirit and with the
Resurrection of Jesus, in which He overturns death and makes
available the !ife of the age to come, yet at the same time we must
also draw attention to the fact that John also links "life" with the
Word. "The words which I have spoken to you are both spirit and
life" (6:63). Similarly, Peter, speaking for the twelve, says, "You
have the words of life" (6:68). And throughout the Fourth Gospel
!ife is linked with believing: whoever believes has eternal life
(3: 15f, et al.). We cannot say that John links life only with the
receiving of the Spirit.
The almost monumental diversity of
language and metaphor in John's Gospel prevents us from
mecha nically limiting the concept of conversion and new birth to
the receiving of the Spirit--even in spite of the exclusive tone of

3:5.
Dunn acknowledges (p. 179) that they are believers, but
believers without having received the Spirit. This seems to put a
severe limitation on the significance of believing. Dunn is to be
followed wholeheartedly when he speaks of the entry on the part
of the disciples into the blessings of the new dispensation as
"staggered" (p. 182), while at the same time not necessaril y
supported in his "three milestones" interpretation of the J ohannine
witness. Though not without its own conundrums, it seems much
better to suggest that those who believed and who followed , who
had been cleansed by virtue of the Word, who belonged to the
Father, were indeed what we could today call Christians , that is,
followers of Jesus.
We may also add that it is possible to suggest that in some
nascent sense they may also have had the Spirit, if we cons ider
John 14: 17, a notoriously difficult text about which to have any
degree of certainty . To begin with, we run into a te xt-critical
problem in determining whether estin (present) or estai (future )
represents the primitive text and whether menei should be
accented as a present or future verb. So, for the three verbs in
this text we ha ve the possibility of one, two or no future tenses.
The first one, ginoskete, is clearly present and either of the other
two, or both , may also be.28 The problem is further compounded
by the fact that, even if we decide text critically for the present
tenses, any or all of the three ve rbs may be regarded as proleptic ,
as futuristic present tenses, so that even with all present tense
verbs the text might be rendered, "You will know Him for He
will abide with you and will be in you." Certainly in erchomai in
verse 18 we have su.c h a futuristic present. Though the latter two
verbs of verse 17 will remain in doubt, less doubt surrounds the
first one: "You know him."29 However, R. E. Brown30 and o ther
commentators prefer the proleptic understanding. Still it may very
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well be that we can understand the present tense "know" in the
sense that by virtue of their identification with Jesus and their
participation in His ministry they "know" the Paraclete, as it
In knowing and following Jesus they also
were, by "proxy."
know the Spirit by which Jesus performs His miracles (Matt
12:28).
If we may appeal to another writer not in the Johannine
tradition, we note that Luke (10:9, 17) records the disciples as
performing the same healings and exorcisms.
Through their
following Him they were, might we say, under the umbrella of the
Spirit. In that sense they do know the Spirit; and in that sense
they bore witness to the power of the Spirit. None of this accords
with subsequent Christian experience. Their experience cannot be
ours, as Dunn says so well. But it is their experience we are
trying to understand. Because life is connected with the receiving
of the Word and with believing, it is quite possible to say that the
disciples "had the !ife of the age to come" prior to the death/
Resurrection of Jesus. As we have noted (John 17:9) they are said
to "belong to the Father." And a certain reading of 14: 17 may
also allow us to affirm that even before receiving the Spirit (20:22)
they do indeed know the Spirit--even though, as we have said,
only by proxy.
That we should even discuss these matters in these terms
assumes that John had, or ought to have had, our questions in
mind. In point of fact it is quite difficult to answer the question
of when the disciples were "converted." We find no indication
from his narrative that this question was part of his agenda.
Other considerations cause us to reject Dunn's "three
milestones" perspective. He connects the insufflation of 20:22
with the new birth of the disciples, in accordance with 3:5 and
6:63 , as well as Genesis 2:7 where emphysao is also used.
However, our context seems to relate to matters other than life
and new birth. The preceding verse suggests the motif of this
appearance to the disciples has to do first with the confirmation of
His aliveness, but then with mission and the power to carry out
that mission . "Just as the Father has sent me, I also am sending
(or, am about to send) you" [emphasis mine]. And the verse after
the insufflation has to do with the transferring of His own
authority regarding forgiveness of sins over to them: "Whoever's
sins you forgive they are forgiven ...."
To interpret the
insufflation as the inbreathing of life, rather than the conveying
of authority and power, is to do violence to the context. In fact,
it is remarkable how similar the context here is with that of Acts
2:4, where the fullness of the Spirit is linked with mission and the
power to engage in mission (Acts l :8; cf., Luke 24:49).
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For Dunn and others, the verb enephysesen carries considerable
weight. It means "to breath into" and is said to carry the idea of
imparting life. Gen 2:7, which describes God as breathing into
Adam with the result that he becomes a living being , is cited as
the inspiration for John 20:22. Concurring support is elicited
from Ezek 37:9, where the breath of God brings life back into the
dry bones. On the other side, elsewhere this same Greek verb
bears a destructive note (Job 4:21; Ezek 21 :26, 22:21). And in
Tobit 6:8 and 11 :11 it relates to a miraculous recovering of sight.
So, it does not necessarily mean the imparting of life.
Furthermore, Michal Wojciechowski has recently brought o ur
attention to the Targums of Gen 2:7 in which the breath of God is
not so much the source of life as of the "word" (Fr., parole).31
He notes that according to the Targums of Neofiti, of Onqelos and
of Pseudo-Jonathan , the insufflation of Adam means that he has
been given the gift of speech. Though these texts are later than
the New Testament, they may reflect a tradition that ex isted in
the first Christian century.
This line of evidence supports one common stream of New
Testament witness of the Spirit which links the Spirit with speech
and communication . At Pentecost the gift of speech is obvio us .
So also is the promise in the first chapter of Acts: "You will
receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you and yo u
will be witnesses to me ..." (v 8). Acts 4:31 concurs: "And all of
them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak the
Word of God boldly." Again, Acts 4: "Then Peter, filled with the
Holy Spirit, said to them" (v 8; cf., Acts 13:9). Though 3:5 and
6:63 link the Spirit with birth and life, the primary significance of
the promised gift of the Spirit in chapters 14-16 is that of truth
and communication. Three times the Paraclete is referred to as
the "Spirit of Truth."
In 14:26 the Spirit will teach them
everything. In 15:26 He will bear witness to Jesus. He will
convict the world of sin , righteousness and judgment (16:8). He
will guide them into all truth (16:13). This is how, we propose ,
John 20:22 must be understood when we see it in the context of
verses 2 1 and 23. To interpret the insufflation of 20:22 in terms
of 3:5 and 6:63 is to ignore its own context.
One other note: the verb elabete, as Bultmann32 and othe rs
have noted, is almost a technical term in the early Church for that
definitive reception of the Spirit which incorporates one into the
Bod y of Christ (cf., John 1:16; 14:17; Acts 2:38; 8:15 , 17; I Cor
2:1 2).33
We suggest, then, that our passage has exactly the same
theological significance for John' s narrative that Acts 2:4 has fo r
Luke's. In both, the bestowal of the Spirit is linked with mission ,
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power and authority. Both may be seen as the culminative act of
the incarnate Jesus following His glorification. As C. H. Dodd has
said, "Accordingly, the gift of the Spirit to the Church is
represented ... as the ultimate climax of the personal relations
between Jesus and His Disciples."34 This is as true of 20:22 as of
Acts 2:4.
But what of the historical disparities between the accounts?
R. E. Brown has noted, "A willingness to neglect temporal
implications for theological significance is not unusual in John."35
He adds, "If John's purpose is forgotten, the attempt to dramatize
in temporal scenes what is sub specie aeternitatis creates
confusion."36 Historical conundrums abound in the Fourth Gospel.
But they must be faced in a way that does justice to Johannine
criteria for "truth" and "gospel." While Dunn would agree up to
a point, at the same time he reminds us that John's narrative is
"Although we cannot deny John's
not history gone amuck.
concern to impress a theological scheme on a chronological
sequence of events, it would not be true to say that the former
completely ignores and suppresses the latter."37 This caveat is
important, but so, too, is his acknowledgment. In view of John's
frequent reference to the coming of the Spirit (7:39 and chapters
14-16), it is much more likely that John would provide us with an
account of that bestowal than that he would narrate an otherwise
not previously mentioned experience . Dunn's suggestion that John
would know of two bestowals, record the promise of one of them,
and then narrate the other38 seems less than convincing. Much the
more natural understanding is that which sees our pericope as the
fulfillment of that promise which is otherwise so important to
John's scheme of things. The historical problems are there, as in
so many sections of this Gospel, but the y cannot rule over what
otherwise seems clearly to be the thrust of John's message.
The themes of John's Gospel, the terminology, (especially) the
context, as well as the fact that at every theological point this
pericope answers to Acts 2:4, all support the view that we do
indeed have here a Johannine Pentecost. It is a highly theologized
version of that inceptive experience which gave birth to the
Church and perfected the work of the incarnate Son.39
This understanding of the pericope makes it very much the
culmination of John's record. So we may be permitted to ask one
more question. Is it possible that at one stage of the production of
this Gospel it was indeed the end of the text? This is not the first
time such a question has been asked of the Fourth Gospel. Many
have suspected that at some point in the process that produced this
Gospel, 20:30f served as the close and that chapter 21 was added
either by the author or an intimate colleague. Others have gone
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even further by pomtmg out various redactional elements
throughout the Gospel--including dislocations.40 More recently, R.
E. Brown has offered a thorough assessment of the matter and has
proposed that the Gospel passed through five stages to reach its
present form. 41 It is not our purpose here to evaluate such efforts
at reconstructing the history of this Gospel, but only to note the
common sentiment that more than one hand may have helped in
producing our Gospel in its present form. At some point in the
process, then , could our pericope have served as the final words
of the narrative?
If we suppose for a moment that this was so, and if we
compare this pericope with Matt 28: 16-20, we find the similarities
to be striking.
Both record a definitive appearance to the
disciples. Both include an indication of doubt (Matt 28: 17; John
20:20). The Great Commission of Matthew is repeated in John (vv
The promise of the continued presence of Jesus in
21-23).
Matthew corresponds to the bestowal of the Spirit in John . And
both Gospels, significantly, end with a saying of Jesus rather that
with some sort of summarizing narrative (Luke) or statement of
purpose (John 20 and 21 ). E. Bammel finds precedent for this in
the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs42 and mentions John as
having the same kind of ending. In fact, Bammel refers to 20:2429 as "a first supplement" (Ger., ein erster Nachtrag) .43 Everything
after 20:23 is anti-climactic and appears to be elaborations of
resurrection themes, including the element of apostolic doubt
(20:24ff), the corporeality of the risen Jesus (21: 1ff) and the
restoration of Peter (21 : 15ff).
John 20: l-23 includes all the elements of what we may call
"the resurrection package": the tomb is found by women to be
empty on Sunday morning (Matt 28: l ff; Mark 16: 1ff; Luke 24: l ff;
John 20: 1ff); some interpretive word is provided by angelic
representative(s) (Matt 28:2ff; Mark 16:3f; Luke 24:4ff; John
20:20); the doubt of the disciples is noted (Matt 28:16; Luke 24: 11 ;
John 20:20); the appearance of Jesus to the disciples as a group
(Matt 28: l 6ff; Luke 24:36ff; John 20: l 9ff); a Great Commission
(Matt 28: l 9f; Luke 24:47; John 20: l 9ff); and finall y, the promise
of power for mission through the promised Holy Spirit who will
continue the Lordship of Jesus within history (Matt 28:20; Luke
24:49; John 20:22).
To be sure, the Resurrection narratives
include other features such as the attempt in Matthew to bribe the
people, and in Luke the walk to Emmaus. But the above
mentioned items represent the core of our Resurrection accounts.
John 20: 19-23 may well have served as a culminative word , if not
of this particular Gospel, then of some Vorlage which was
incorporated at some stage of the redactional process. It is enough
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to note that nothing is missing from the heart of the Resurrection
records when Matthew ends as it does, and if John had once
ended as I have proposed.
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Matera, Frank J. What Are They Saying About Mark? New York /
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987. ix, 115 pp . $4.95 paper.
ISBN 0-8091- 2885-3.
Frank Matera studied at St. Bernard Seminary, Rochester, NY,
and the University of Louvain, Belgium , before completing
doctoral studies in biblical literature at Union Theological
Seminary, Richmond, Virginia. Professor Matera is known by his
published Gospel research.
He serves as a priest of the
archdiocese of Hartford and is professor of New Testament at St.
John's Seminary, Boston.
Like other entries in the "W hat Are They Saying A bout... ?"
series, Matera's work ai ms to introduce stude nts to the "lay of the
land"--in this case, in Markan studies. Matera reaches as far
back as Wrede but concentrates on the key figures in the stud y of
Mark's Gospel over the last twenty-fi ve yea rs. He revi ews their
work and attempts to discern the present direction of Markan
studies in five major areas: (I) se tting, (2) Christology, (3)
treatment of the disciples, (4) composition, and (5) narrative of
the Gospel.
A brief statement of conclusions is followed b y endnotes and
suggestions for further reading ( 44 entries, the earliest from 1959).
The presentation is consistently clear and non-polemic. While the
work is aimed primarily at seminar y and college students
beginning serious biblical study, persons with broad acquaintance
with biblical scholarship will find Matera's stud y useful. Perso ns
wanting a more exhaustive re view of histo ry of Markan studies
will need to consult a work like Sean P. Kealy's, Mark 's Gospel : A
History of Its Interpretation (New York/ Ramsey: Paulist Press,
1982), though Matera's mastery of the interplay between the iss ues
addressed is superior to Kealy's , in my judgment.
In Matera's view, Mark is written from and to a Roman
setting just prior to 70 A.D. b y (as well as anyone else) John Mark ,
associated in complex ways with Peter. Charting the immense
shock waves from Wilhelm Wrede's discovery of the "Mess ianic
secret," Matera concludes the precise function of this theme in the
Gospel remains itself a secret.
Wrede's most important
contribution was the insistence that Mark's Gospel is at heart a
Christological statement, not material for a life of Christ.
Ultimately stemming from the Wrede agenda, the attempts to
establish a corrective Christology in Mark have made their greatest
contribution , says Matera, in demonstrating the centrality of the
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su ffering and death of Jesus to any ad equate understanding of
He doubts an alleged theios aner concep t
Jesus in Mark.
illumina tes the problem a nd questions the ability to reco nstruct the
heresies at which Mark's "correction" would be aimed. In his
opi nion, the efforts usuall y result in an unnecessary polarization of
the Son of Man/ Son of God themes which are to be seen as
complementary, not contradic tory. In Matera's view, the secrecy
motif relates to the theme of the suffering Son of God, the key to
Mark's royal Christology.
Matera is unconvinced by those who argue Mark 's treatment
of the disciples as a polemic. Instead , Mark writes with pastoral
motives, lead ing his community to "follow Jesus" past the lures
a nd dange rs of th eir paga n setting. The disciples' ignorance is
primaril y due to the fact that they know Jesus only apart from His
death and Resurrection.
This introd uctory work does not intend to elaborate and
defend at length a position on the Gospel of Mark . But nowhere
do Matera's basic conce rns appear more clearl y than in hi s
d isc uss ion of the compos ition of the Gospel, the issue reall y at the
hea rt of al l the oth er questions.
In Matera's judgmen t, the last centur y of Markan scholarship
has come to a n impasse for lack of ev idence. Eve ry c hap ter ends
with a "no co nsensus" verdict from conventional approaches
(source, form and redaction c riticism) to the Gospel's c hief
ques tions. Matera concludes that it is not now poss ible to identify
wi th confidence th e sources used in the compos ition of Mark . He
is skeptical of app roaches which in volve overly speculative
reconstruc tions, lack convincing external evidence, fragm ent the
book , a nd fail to produce a consensus answer to the basic
questions rai sed by the Gospel.
Matera finds th e most promising approach in reading the
Gospel as story, using the tools of the newer literary and
In Matera's mind this does not mea n
rhetor ical c riticism.
abandonin g the questions of source, form and redaction. Rath er
he urges focus on a more immediate agenda, the read ing of the
Gospel and its literary units as wholes as a prerequisite for
returning to historical questions. But he warns against neglecting
historica l iss ues in a purely literar y stud y of the text. I think his
assessment is correc t.
In my judgme nt it is particularly fitting that a review of
Matera's work should find its way into a volume honor ing Dr .
Robert A. Tra ina. Dr. Traina's work proceeds on premises similar
to Matera's rega rding the necessity of focusing on the literary
fo rm of th e text as it is and as a whole, and of eschewing
approaches which f ragment the composition and in volve overly
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speculative reconstructions as the very framework in which the
research will proceed. Dr. Traina was doing the "new" literary
and rhetorical criticism and publishing its theory and results years
before the terms were brought to biblical studies.
The impasse documented by Matera is due in part to the
inclination of biblical studies in the academy to be confined by
the most recent fad. It remains to be seen whether literary/
rhetorical critics will achieve any greater agreement regarding
major issues in Markan study than those using other methods.
Here again, Dr. Traina's comprehensive approach to biblical study
anticipates the problem by incorporating all critical methods
necessary to understand the text as a whole. If there is any hope
for consensus, one suspects it is in a convergence of
methodologies. This is the direction in which Matera's review of
current Markan studies, his own published work, and that of
Robert A. Traina point.
DA YID L. THOMPSON, PH .D.
Associate Professor of Biblical Literature
Asbury Theological Seminary
Mann, C. S. Mark: A New Translation with Introduction and
Commentary. Anchor Bible, vol. 27. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1986. 714 pp. $20.00. ISBN 0-385-03253-6.
This is Mann's second contribution to the Anchor Bible series;
he co-authored, with the late W. F. Albright, the volume on
Matthew, which appeared in 1971. That volume has generally not
been well received by the New Testament scholarly community,
because of its overemphasis upon purely technical matters, its lack
of attention to theological issues, and its insistence upon the
priority of Matthew, a view that is overwhelmingly rejected by
New Testament scholars.
In the present commentary, Mann continues to argue for the
minority opm10n regarding synoptic ongms, adopting the
"Griesbach Hypothesis," which posits that Mark is an abridgement
of Matthew (the first Gospel to be written) and Luke. This
understanding of synoptic origins stands over against the
commonly-held "Two-Source Hypothesis," viz., that Mark was the
first Gospel, and Matthew and Luke used Mark and a sayings
source (usually labelled "Q") as the basis for their Gospels.
Actually, Mann's position is a somewhat modified form of the
Griesbach Hypothesis, since he allows the possibility of the
priority of Luke, and even suggests that a radically revised form
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of the Q theory could find a place in his reconstruction of
synoptic origins.
The fact that the Griesbach Hypothesis has not been generall y
accepted by New Testament scholars leads Mann to engage in an
extensive defense of the theory. Yet Mann presents virtually no
new arguments for the Griesbach Hypothesis beyond those put
forth by W. R . Farmer in his classic work , The S ynoptic Problem .
These arguments are fraught with as many improbabilities and
implausibilities now as when they were offered by Farmer in
1964. The Two-Source Hypothesis remains the theory that best
explains the relationship between the synoptic Gospe ls, while
creating the fewest problems. This is not to say, however, that
the Two-Source Hypothesis does not contain difficulties. In fac t,
the value of these challenges to the Two-Source Hypothesis is that
they point to the necessarily tentative and provisional character of
any critical reconstruction, including one so broadly accepted over
the past century as the Two-Source Hypothesis . This recognition is
in part responsible for the recent emergence of lite rar y critic ism
in the study of the Gospels and Acts.
It is clear that the adoption of the Griesbach H ypothesis has
far-reaching implications for the interpretation of Mark , includin g
such questions as the Sitz im Leben out of which the G ospe l of
Mark arose, the purpose of the Gospel as reflected in Mar k's
redactional activity, and the ways in which Mark's redac tion of
Matthew and Luke informs the meaning of individual passages of
the Gospel as well as the theology of the Gospel as a who le. And
Mann addresses each of these issues; in fact, this co mme ntar y is
the first major attempt to interpret the Gospel of Mark from the
perspective of the Griesbach Hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the
answers Mann gives to these questions are less than satisfac to ry.
Mann is convinced that Mark, the auditor of Peter, began the
compilation of data in Rome, but actuall y wrote his G ospel
(primarily on the basis of Matthew and Luke) in Palestine
sometime between A.D. 60-66. He argues that the G ospel best
suits this setting because (a) its urgency reflects the chao tic
climate of antebellum Palestine, and (b) the redactional te nde nc ies
of Mark (esp. chap. 13) assume the state of affairs in the
Palestinian Christian community during that period . Into this
situation Mark thrust his Gospel , edited to emphas ize the hope fo r
the continuation of the Palestinian church, on the basis of the
victory of Jesus its Lord.
But Mann's evidence is strained . Neither the no te of urgency
in the Gospel nor the putative redactional movements of Mark
necessarily point to this setting. Granting Mann's proposal, it is
difficult to understand why the Gospel of Mark was writte n at all ,
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since Matthew and Luke were already known and used in
Palestine, and they address the concerns which Mann identifies
behind Markan redaction. Further, if Mann's reconstruction is
accurate, Mark omitted many passages from Matthew and Luke
which speak to these concerns, while bringing over intact
extraneous material simply because Mark felt bound to the
tradition.
Mann's attempt to interpret the Gospel by an examination of
Mark's redaction of Matthew and Luke is generally not
productive. The reasons are obvious: the purpose Mann ide ntifies
behind Markan redaction is too general to inform the specific
interpretation of individual passages; and Mark's redaction of his
sources is essentially a redaction of omission, and it is difficult to
discern theology primarily on the basis of the omission of
material.
This massive commentary contains many helpful insights and
much technical background information. Yet, given the many
excellent commentaries on Mark, and the tendentious character of
this volume, most students of Mark would be better served by
investing in more reliable works.
DA YID R . BAUER, PH. D.
Assistant Professor of English Bible
Asbury Theological Seminary
Achtemeier, Paul J. The Quest for Unity in the New T estament
Church. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. xii , 132 pp.
Paper. ISBN 0-8006-1972-2.
According to Paul J. Achtemeier, professor of New Testament
at Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, and the
editor of Interpretation, unity was an ideal to be stri ved for, not
attained in the New Testament church as described by Luke in the
Book of Acts. Luke had only a second-hand knowledge of the
early church. He reworked his sources, which were fragmentary
and incomplete , according to his preconceived (biased) theological
idea about how church deve loped.
Achtemeier focuses his investigation on the relationship
between Paul and the Jerusalem leadership. In Galatians 1-2 Paul
mentions his two visits to Jerusalem . Achtemeier identifies the
first visit (Gal 1:18-21) with Acts 9:26; and the second (Gal 2:110) with Acts 11: 1-18, when the Jerusalem leadership, under
Peter, agreed that the Gentiles could become Christians without
circumcision. Even though Acts did not mention it, Paul was
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there. He accepted this agreement and was encouraged to carry
on Gentile missions under such agreement.
Later, under the
influence of James, the Jerusalem leadership imposed the decree
of the Apostolic Council (Acts 15) upon the Gentile Christians.
Even though Acts mentions Peter, Paul and Barnabas as
participating in that Council, in fact they did not. When the
decree was brought to Antioch, Peter and Barnabas accepted it.
But Paul considered it to be a breach of the earlier agreement and
rejected it.
This brought about the separation of Paul and
Barnabas. Contrary to the report in Acts, the decree actually
caused division in the early church, even in the Gentile missions .
Everywhere he went, Paul was opposed for his theological
pos1t10n. Attempting reconciliation with the Jewish Christians,
Paul made a collection of money among the Gentiles Christians for
the poor in Jerusalem. This final attempt ended in failure.
This book is well organized. The argument is easy to follow .
At each step the author usually spells out the methodology, and
indicates the next step to follow. Adequate endnoting, including
those of opposite views, is another helpful feature of the book .
There are some attractive interpretations of certain biblical
passages. Some questions, however, can be raised. Achtemeier
highlights the fact that James informed Paul of the decree of the
Apostolic Council at their last meeting in Jerusalem (Acts 2 1:25).
From this he argues for Paul's absence at the Council. However,
even if Jam.e s knew Paul was present at the Council, it would still
be natural for him to mention that in the context of Acts 2 1:25.
If we take the "we" section of Acts seriously, as many reputable
sc holars do, then we cannot agree with Achtemeier that Luke had
only second-hand and very limited knowledge of Paul. If Luke
traveled with Paul for a while , his presentation of Paul's activities
would not have been mere speculation or wishful thinking.
Paul never mentions the decree of the Apostolic Council in his
epistles. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that he did
not know about it or resisted it. His treatment of the issue of
food offered to idols in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 agrees with it in
principle. Probably his support of the decree was misinterpreted
by so me as his attempt to please men. So he asked the rhetorical
question "Or am I trying to please men?" in Gal 1:10.
If, as Achtemeier claims, "Paul ended his career an isolated
figure, whose theological emphases were destined for swift decline
in the decades to follow" (p. 61 ), then why were so many epistles
of Paul canonized in the New Testament?
JOSEPHS. WANG, P11.D.
Professor of New Testament
Asbury Theological Seminary
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Aune, David E. The New Testament in Its Literary Environment.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987. 262 pp. $22.95 .
ISBN 0-664-21912-8.
Aune's work is the eighth contribution to the Library of Early
Christianity series edited by Wayne Meeks. The purpose of this
series is to explore the Jewish and Greco-Roman contexts within
which the New Testament and early Christianity arose. The high
quality and practical value of this series has been further
enhanced by Aune's contribution.
Aune surveys four types of literature in the Jewish and
Greco-Roman milieu: biography, historiography, letters and
revelatory literature, relating them to the Gospels, Luke-Acts,
Christian letters and apocalypses. One of the added bonuses of
Aune's presentation is that he does not limit himself to the New
Testament writings but includes Christian writings of the same
genres from the second century .
Aune flies in the face of much twentieth - century New
Testament scholarship with its strong aversion against classifying
the Gospels as biographies.
His survey of biography in the
Greco-Roman world reveals a genre characterized by great
diversity through a coalescence of numerous literary forms and
even other genres . Having laid a strong foundation through his
broad representations from ancient biographical writings, Aune
makes a strong case for the Gospels as biography.
One feature which somewhat weakens Aune's case, however, is
his tendency to presuppose the "assured results of critical
scholarship" regarding the historical reliability of the Gospels.
Aune seems to subscribe to the theory that the Gospels are largely
"fictitious" works of the early church and provide little, if any,
support for knowing the historical Jesus. Even though Aune
correctly warns that "it is illegitimate to allow theological
assumptions to determine the results of literary criticism," and
assumes "that the Evangelists wrote with historical inte ntions"
(p. 64), he goes on to state, "To claim that the Evangelists wrote
biography with historical intentions, then, does not guarantee that
they preserved a single historical fact . It does suggest that they
restricted the scope of invention to that appropriate to the
biographical task as popularly understood" (p. 65).
The
overlooked consideration, which may also contribute to the lack of
consensus on the genre of the Gospels, is that the Gospels convey
a unique
(divine/human) event which not even the
most diverse literary genre can adequately contain or convey.
Such a unique event, of course, would have no antecedents in
biographical literature except as unhistorical fictions to which it
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would naturally, but erroneously, be compared.
Another weakness is Aune's totally unquestioned assumption of
the Two-Source Hypothesis. He reflects no awareness of the
recrudescence of the Griesbach Hypothesis which has received
added impetus with the renewed emphasis upon literary criticism
in recent years. It seems that Aune would have done himself and
his readers an even greater service had he reflected upon such
issues in the light of his excellent portrayal of the literary
environment of the New Testament. This criticism is generally
true for the entire scope of the book. Rather than using the
findings of his study of the literary milieu of the New Testament
to examine afresh the basic questions of New Testament study ,
Aune presumes results of critical scholarship which are
increasingly questioned .
One might question Aune's tendency to presume the fictional
nature of much of Acts, but he has clearly and, I believe,
unquestionably demonstrated that Acts falls into the literary genre
of historiography. This is a healthy balance for the prevailin g
perspective which views Acts primarily as a theological treatise.
Aune's work with letters is probably the strongest portion of
the book. Not only does he provide a locus for Christian letters
within the literature of the Greco-Roman world, but he also
integrates them with the prevailing conventions of Greco-Roman
rhetoric and diatribe. One of Aune's strong contributions here is
to show that rhetorical conventions make it far more difficult to
assuredly define the opponents of the writer of a New Testament
letter.
What have previously been taken as arguments of
"opponents" may be nothing more than rhetorical devices used by
the writer to defend or strengthen the argument.
Aune's discussion of apocalyptic writings reflects an excellent
grasp of the leading edge of the field. Unfortunately, however,
he succumbs to the prevailing socio-literary analysis of apocal yptic
which allows no room for the possibility of genuine revelatory
experiences. The book of Revelation, consequently, is seen as one
more example of Israelite-Jewish and Greco-Roman revelatory
literature. While it is clear that Revelation utilizes the literary
style of revelatory literature, should there not be room for the
possibility that a genuine mystical experience lies behind the
literature?
Aune also accepts the prevailing perspective of
Revelation as eschatologically oriented without considering the
possibility that it reflects a vision of the immanence of the
Kingdom in ongoing history.
One of the most helpful features of Aune's work, as with the
entire Library of Early Christianity, is the provision of a list of
excellent resources for further study, delineated by subtopics for
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each chapter. One of the most disconcerting f ea tu res stylistically
is an excessive and intrusive use of parenthetical remarks.
In spite of its several flaws, Aune's work is required reading
for any serious student of the New Testament, a task that will be
not only informative and enlightening, but also stimulating and
provocative of new insights and understandings.
M. ROBERT MULHOLLAND, JR., TH.D.
Professor of New Testament
Asbury Theological Seminary
Hayes, John H. and Frederick Prussner. Old Testament Theology:
Its History and Development. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985.
290 pp. $15.95, paper. ISBN 0-8042-0146-3.
Frederick C. Prussner is the primary author of this work. He
died in 1978 before its publication. Prussner served as professor
of Old Testament at the Candler School of Theology, Emory
University. The book represents a significant part of his doctoral
dissertation submitted to the Divinity School of the University of
Chicago in 1952.
It remained the task of John H. Hayes,
currently professor of Old Testament at Candler, to expand and
update Prussner's work for publication .
As the title indicates, the purpose is to trace the historical
development of Old Testament study from the time of Luther to
the present. This monumental undertaking is approached by a
review of more than fifty theologians and an examination of their
presuppositions and methodological pursuit of the biblical text.
The scope of the work is far-reaching and inclusive. It elucidates
the difficulty of speaking of the Old Testament theology at all.
This is a landmark volume in Old Testament study a nd
represents a much needed-treatise in the scholarly arena. Hayes
and Prussner have attempted to present a fair, unbiased
description of the various Old Testament academies in as thorough
a way as possible.
Such thoroughness is perceived in the
treatment that each theological position receives. Not infrequently
the authors trace and explicate the various precursors that
influenced a particular Old Testament theological stance. Each
position is carefully considered within its historical context such
that the reader is able to determine the forces at work during a
particular time period and, hence, understand better the process
and perspectives of Old Testament study. From the emergence of
Protestant Scholasticism, with its primary concern to make the
Bible "fit" preconceived dogmatic orthodoxy, Hayes and Prussner
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demonstrate the evolution of theological thought along a
reactionary axis: the response of Pietism-Romanticism and
Rationalism to Scholasticism; the subsequent rise of Hegel's
Idealism and the conservative response of the early nine teenth
century.
The authors retell the story well and illustrate the need for Old
Testament scholarship to step beyond the bounds of particular
parochialisms to the wider appreciation of the contributions and
presuppositions of other perspectives. The major part of the book
(presumably written by Prussner) indicates a sympathetic, unbiased
presentation of the material. It seems unfortunate that such an
engaging approach to the material is deemed unnecessary b y Hayes
in the final section of the book where, time and again, viable
theological positions are unfairly dismissed and personal interests
are peddled.
Old Testament Theology is a much-needed volume.
It is

written competently with much research (as one might expect
from a doctoral dissertation) and presented in a lucid style whic h
makes for interesting reading. Without doubt, this book will be of
inestimable value both to teachers and students in the academy as
well as to pastors in the parish, notwithstanding the rather
unworthy update of the final twenty-five pages .
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